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inferences accurately reflected available evidence 
and scholarship.
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As processes of globalization have accelerated in recent decades, there have been widespread ef-
forts to develop appropriate forms of governance to 
deal effectively with emerging worldwide challenges. 
This paper reviews the existing evidence concerning 
the impacts of global governance on the social deter-
minants of health (SDH). First, it documents the tran-
sition taking place towards global governance related 
to the SDH in terms of institutional actors, and their 
relative roles, power and authority. Second, it assesses 
how emerging forms of global governance may be in-
fluencing the SDH. How might various institutions, 
and the distribution and use of power and authority 
among them, affect the SDH? Third, this paper assess-
es the quality of emerging forms of global governance 
against recognized “good governance” criteria. Fourth, 
it identifies how global governance can play a transfor-
mational role in addressing the SDH.  
The analysis suggest that the SDH are not well served 
by the current system of global governance, either in 
the field of health or more generally. The emergent 
global governance architecture relevant to the SDH is 
characterized by the following:
• “Thick” governance in certain issue areas, 
notably economic relations such as trade, 
investment and finance, but “thinner” 
governance in other issue areas, notably 
the social sectors. Despite increased recent 
attention to selected global health issues, 
resulting in the creation of various individual 
initiatives, addressing the SDH has not yet 
been given sufficient priority in the building 
and running of effective global governance 
institutions.
• The relative balance of power among state, 
market and civil society institutions has 
shifted radically in recent decades. The private 
sector (market) and civil society have gained 
more prominent roles at the global level, 
including institutions concerned with global 
health, while state institutions have seen a 
relative decline.
Globalization, Global Governance and
the Social Determinants of Health:
A review of the linkages
and agenda for action
Executive Summary
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• Within each type of institution, there is 
a greater concentration of power in fewer 
hands at the global level. Large transnational 
corporations, major industrialized countries 
and mostly Northern-based “international” 
non-government organizations have come 
to dominate global governance, while many 
remain marginalized by the current archi-
tecture. Economic globalization defined by 
economic growth has been prioritized over 
social and environmental protection.
• A certain degree of innovation has character-
ized some mechanisms in global institutions 
concerned with the SDH. However, these 
innovations to broaden representation in 
global governance with non-state actors, 
most notably the corporate sector, have been 
accompanied by the simultaneous reduction 
of the power of competent UN bodies. And in 
that way they have been conducive to further 
fragmentation and confusion of global gover-
nance on these essential health issues.
Through poverty reduction strategies and the MDGs, 
there has been increased attention to the SDH with-
in a number of institutions. However, there remain 
concerns that these initiatives have lacked genuine 
commitment and been narrowly interpreted in their 
implementation, focusing on technical interventions 
and measurable outcomes rather than on underlying 
structural factors. The focus of many GPPPs is on 
disease-oriented activities and biomedical interven-
tions, as opposed to changing the broader structural 
conditions which affect the SDH. Where powerful 
non-health interests prevail, there are profound dif-
ficulties in gaining sufficient attention and political 
priority for health issues in general and for the SDH 
in particular.
This paper’s review of selected global institutions, 
against key criteria of good governance, points to a 
number of weaknesses that are detrimental to tackling 
the SDH:
• The long-standing problems of coordination and 
coherence, characterizing global institutions 
in general, extend to institutions concerned 
with the SDH. The resulting patchwork of 
institutional mandates, activities, authority and 
resources reflects the absence of an agreed plan 
or strategic vision to tackle the SDH.
• The key global institutions affecting the SDH 
have inadequate systems of transparency and 
accountability. A more critical assessment of 
transparency and accountability mechanisms 
is still needed. Foremost there is need for an 
overall system of “checks and balances” within 
and across global institutions to ensure collec-
tive transparency and accountability.
• There have been some efforts to diversify 
representation within global institutions 
concerned with the SDH, but limited efforts 
to redistribute power within them. There is a 
clear tension between the need to accommo-
date diverse perspectives, through a plurality 
of institutions, and the optimal use of limited 
resources through coordinated action. How 
can the SDH be served best?
• Resources for global health have increased in 
recent years (e.g. to GPPPs and to initiatives 
to strengthen cooperation on global health 
issues such as pandemic influenza). However, 
the governance of resource mobilization and 
allocation has remained firmly under the control 
of major donors. Decisions continue to reflect 
accountability to foreign and economic policy 
goals, and to domestic constituents which, 
given electoral cycles, tend to favour short-
term projects and measurable outcomes.
• There is a distinct lack of overall leadership 
among global institutions affecting the SDH 
in terms of formally recognized authority.
There is strong evidence at the national level that 
good governance is an important factor in addressing 
the SDH. Strengths and weaknesses in national gov-
ernance for the SDH might be applied to the global 
level where there is a need for fuller assessment of 
how good governance contributes to tackling the 
SDH.
The overall recommendation of the paper is for a 
fundamental review of the structure of global gover-
nance in the context of the needs, priorities and po-
litical culture of the early 21st century. Such a process 
would clearly need to go beyond the SDH to other 
concerns not recognized as priorities in the 1940s, 
such as environmental sustainability. However, the 
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SDH must clearly play a central role in the process. 
Building global institutional and intergovernmental 
support for such a large but important initiative re-
quires WHO to promote this goal among its mem-
ber nations and its global institutional partners.
More specifically the report recommends the
following:
1. There needs to be more critical, detailed 
and systematic assessment of health and 
non-health focused institutions, individually 
and collectively, in terms of their de facto 
concern and impact on the various SDH, 
and the effects of their governance structures 
in this context. The WHO should assume 
institutional leadership in undertaking this 
assessment, working with partner institutions, 
CSOs and independent researchers/scholars.
2. The contemporary global governance archi-
tecture is dominated by institutional and 
policy perspectives that constrain action to 
effectively address the SDH. The first step 
in a reform process to correct this imbalance 
is development of criteria for good global 
governance related to the SDH, based on 
the assessments recommended above. Again, 
WHO should assume institutional leadership 
in this regard.
3. As an initial product of the reform process 
(as above), WHO member states should 
be encouraged to give higher priority to 
addressing the SDH. WHO should reflect 
that priority by allocating substantial and 
commensurate core funding, by hiring more 
social scientists and nurses and by building the 
corresponding capacity of its staff. 
4. It is recommended that WHO play a lead role 
in providing scientific and technical support 
to address the SDH. This review of existing 
global institutions finds WHO to be the most 
appropriate focus for this work. However, 
the organization must adapt and apply its 
technical expertise to achieve a focused agenda 
which gives much greater emphasis to tackling 
the SDH.
5. To effectively play this role, WHO’s inde-
pendence from sectional interests, and the 
symmetry of its accountability to member 
states, needs to be more effectively ensured. 
Its conception of health and institutional 
structure should also move decisively beyond 
a vertical, disease-specific and biomedically 
focused model, towards a more holistic and 
multidisciplinary model.
6. WHO should seek a resolution for formal 
support of SDH and to ensure longer time 
frame for work and activities.
7. There is a need for stronger consensus and 
for more concerted coordination of relevant 
global institutions if the SDH are to be 
tackled effectively. It is recommended that 
ECOSOC be strengthened and, together with 
WHO, formally tasked to oversee such work, 
with relevant UN organizations including 
WHO reporting to it.
8. CSOs can better coordinate their actions 
aimed at influencing the key global institu-
tions affecting the SDH.
9. The human rights-based approach should 
be used as an analytical and normative 
framework and advocacy tool in support of 
the SDH by WHO and other multilateral 
institutions.
10. Global institutions whose policies impact 
significantly on the SDH, notably WHO, 
the World Bank, IMF and WTO, should 
be required to include health ministries and 
relevant CSOs in key decision-making bodies 
and negotiations on issues substantially affect-
ing the SDH.
11. Alternative financing mechanisms, more inde-
pendent of political interference by individual 
donors, should be systematically assessed and 
adopted.
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As processes of globalization have accelerated in recent decades, there have been widespread ef-
forts to develop appropriate forms of governance to 
deal effectively with emerging worldwide challenges. 
Governance broadly concerns the agreed actions and 
means adopted by a society to promote collective ac-
tion and deliver collective solutions in pursuit of com-
mon goals (Dodgson et al. 2002). Governance can be 
formed at different levels of social organization – lo-
cal, state/provincial, national, regional and so on – and 
can become closely intertwined. Global governance can 
be defined as:
the complex of formal and informal 
institutions, mechanisms, relationships, and 
processes between and among states, markets, 
citizens and organizations, both inter- and 
non-governmental, through which collective 
interests on the global plane are articulated, 
rights and obligations are established, and 
differences are mediated (Thakur and Weiss in 
press).
Global governance for health concerns (a) any institu-
tions and practices of global governance which affect 
the determinants of health and (b) institutions and 
practices of global governance specifically created to 
address health determinants and outcomes.
The purpose of this paper is to review the existing 
evidence concerning the impacts of global gover-
nance on the social determinants of health (SDH). 
This requires some analysis of the nature of global 
governance in the early 21st century, a period of 
intense debate and institutional transition towards 
forms of governance that seek to better manage 
the diverse and far reaching impacts of globaliza-
tion (Fidler 2005b). Despite its current imperfec-
tions and formative nature, global governance is the 
overarching institutional framework in which health 
goals are collectively agreed upon and pursued across 
countries. As such, this paper focuses on how global 
governance affects the SDH, through both direct 
action and more indirectly by shaping political and 
economic structures which influence them.
Globalization, Global Governance and
the Social Determinants of Health:
A review of the linkages
and agenda for action
1.1 Introduction
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1.2 Rationale
There are four analytical tasks undertaken by this pa-
per. First, it documents the transition taking place 
towards global governance related to the SDH in 
terms of institutional actors, and their relative roles, 
power and authority. This requires an understanding 
of the changing architecture comprising health-based 
and non health-based institutions. The paper exam-
ines why these shifts have occurred and assesses what 
influences their decision-making and actions.
Second, the paper assesses how emerging forms of 
global governance may be influencing the SDH. 
How might various institutions, and the distribu-
tion and use of power and authority among them, 
affect the SDH? The content of specific policies of 
such institutions as the World Bank and Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) will be reviewed. The 
paper seeks to understand governance of, and by, 
these institutions. For example, the World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO) has influenced standard-setting 
procedures and commercial regulation in interna-
tional trade. In turn it has conferred legitimacy on 
the role and status of the Codex Alimentarius Com-
mission (CAC) regarding food standards, as well as 
provided policy space for corporate interests seeking 
to influence standards adopted by the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO). Similarly, 
decision-making processes in the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
and less formal networking events, such as the World 
Economic Forum (WEF), shape economic policies, 
many of which (e.g. trade and investment, aid, debt 
relief ) impact on the SDH.
Third, this paper assesses the quality of emerging 
forms of global governance against recognized “good 
governance” criteria. What is “good governance” and 
how can this be achieved at different levels of gov-
ernance and by various types of institutional actors 
(Ball and Dunn 1997)? As Vayrynen (1999, p. xi) 
writes:
most international problems today have 
domestic roots which spill over borders and 
thus threaten the security of other people; 
refugee flows are a case in point. Therefore, 
global governance cannot replace the need for 
good governance in national societies; in fact, 
in the absence of quality local governance, 
global and regional arrangements are bound 
to fail or will have only limited effectiveness. 
In a way, global governance has to be built 
from the ground up and then linked back to 
the local conditions.
While this cannot be a comprehensive analysis, 
members of the Globalization Knowledge Network 
selected global governance institutions deemed to ex-
ert considerable influence on the SDH or to be rep-
resentative of a class of global institution. These were 
then assessed against the following criteria: coordina-
tion and coherence, transparency and accountability, 
participation and representation, resource mobiliza-
tion and allocation, and leadership. It is argued that 
addressing poor governance within and across global 
governance institutions is a necessary prerequisite to 
tackling the SDH.
Fourth, there is a need to identify how global gov-
ernance can play a transformational role in address-
ing the SDH. While there have been impressive im-
provements in health status over the past century, 
these gains have not been equitably shared within 
and across countries (Sen and Bonita 2000), and the 
rate of improvement has slowed in recent decades.1 
Innovative forms of global governance have emerged 
in recent decades seeking to address enduring and 
emerging health challenges. The Framework Con-
vention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), as the first 
international health treaty, was enabled by innova-
tive global governance processes involving govern-
ments, civil society and the private sector (Collin et 
al. 2002). A plethora of global public-private part-
nerships (GPPPs) have been formed. Global social 
movements, such as the Framework Convention 
Alliance (FCA), People’s Health Movement (PHM) 
and the women’s health movement have also played 
a prominent role. The paper concludes with recom-
mendations on how global governance can be more 
equity oriented and pro-health.
 1  See Cornia G., Rosignoli S., Tiberti L. (2007), “Globalization and health: pathways of transmission and evidence of impact,” Discussion Paper, Globalization Knowledge   
 Network, WHO Commission on Social Determinants of Health. 
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1.3 Global governance and the social 
determinants of health
1.3.1 Global governance
Governance concerns the agreed actions and means 
adopted by a society to promote collective action and 
solutions in pursuit of common goals. Governance 
takes place whenever people seek to organize them-
selves to achieve a shared end through agreed rules 
and procedures. This can take place at different levels 
of decision-making and action. If a local community 
decides to initiate a campaign to slow traffic speed and 
improve road safety, this requires some form of gov-
ernance to organize the effort. If a global campaign is 
initiated to strengthen tuberculosis control, an agreed 
form of governance is needed to take decisions, for ex-
ample, on strategy, resource mobilization and imple-
mentation of agreed actions.
Importantly governance is not synonymous with 
government:
Both refer to purposive behaviour, to goal 
oriented activities, to systems of rule; but 
government suggests activities that are backed by 
formal authority…whereas governance refers to 
activities backed by shared goals that may or may 
not derive from legal and formally prescribed 
responsibilities and that do not necessarily rely 
on police powers to overcome defiance and 
attain compliance (Rosenau 1995, p. 15).
This distinction between government and governance 
can be further understood within an historical context. 
The Peace of Westphalia (1648), which ended the Thir-
ty Years War, established the modern system of nation-
states. While ostensibly centred on European powers, 
the treaty marked formal recognition albeit uneven ap-
plication of four key principles that still govern interna-
tional relations today. They are the sovereignty of states 
and fundamental right of political self-determination; 
legal equality between states; international treaties be-
tween states; and non-intervention of one state in the 
internal affairs of another state. Over the next 350 years, 
the principles of state sovereignty and equality have led 
to the gradual formation of 192 states (recognized by 
the UN), each with a government exerting formal au-
thority over its people and territory.
The broader concept of governance has gained rel-
evance since 1945 with increased integration of the 
world economy, proliferation of non-state actors and 
globalization. As McGrew (2000, p. 130) describes:
Contemporary patterns of globalization raise 
the most profound questions about how modern 
societies are governed and – normatively 
speaking — how they should be governed…
What are the limits to national power and 
how effective is national government when 
the organization of economic and social life 
appears systematically to transcend territorial 
jurisdictions?
By the late 20th century the question of how to effec-
tively govern a world where many issue areas (e.g. illicit 
drug trade, financial and capital flows, environmental 
degradation, migration) transcend national borders, 
elicited wide-ranging debate. Diverse perspectives 
have been put forth, ranging from the creation of a 
global government, to minimalist laissez faire forms of 
governance (Held and McGrew 2002).
Global governance is thus “the sum of the many ways 
individuals and institutions, public and private, 
manage their common affairs…[through] intergov-
ernmental relationships…[and] NGOs, citizens’ 
movements, multinational corporations, and the 
global capitalist market” (Commission on Global 
Governance 1995). The World Commission on the 
Social Dimensions of Globalization (WCSDG) de-
fines global governance as “the system of rules and 
institutions established by the international com-
munity and private actors to manage political, eco-
nomic and social affairs” (ILO 2004, p. 75). To date 
global governance can be seen as emergent in a few 
selected issue areas, in some cases bringing together 
a diversity of state and non-state actors, and lead-
ing to innovative institutional mechanisms. In other 
areas, global governance remains weak or nonexis-
tent, revealing gaps in authority, regulation, resource 
management and, ultimately, effectiveness of collec-
tive action (Ware 2006). Importantly the nature of 
global governance remains the subject of consider-
able political dispute. While some perceive con-
temporary developments as progress towards more 
pluralist and democratic forms of governance, oth-
ers have grave concerns about the concentration and 
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misuse of power, and the disadvantaging of certain 
social groups, such as the poor and women (Held 
1995; Falk 1999). The nature, goals and impacts 
of emerging forms of global governance, therefore, 
remain highly contested (Barnett and Duvall 2005; 
Kickbusch 2003).
1.3.2 The principles of good governance
An integral part of debates about global governance 
is the need to achieve “good governance”, a term 
widely used and often misused among donor agen-
cies, practitioners, policy-makers and scholars. There 
is widespread recognition that current forms of global 
governance fall short in their capacity to manage glo-
balization effectively. For example, the World Com-
mission on the Social Dimensions of Globalization 
reports:
the problems we have identified are not due 
to globalization as such but to deficiencies in 
its governance. Global markets have grown 
rapidly without the parallel development of 
economic and social institutions necessary for 
their smooth equitable functioning. At the same 
time, there is concern about the unfairness of 
key global rules on trade and finance and their 
asymmetric effects on rich and poor countries. 
(ILO 2004, p. xi)
While recognizing the need for improving the quality 
of governance, what precisely constitutes good gover-
nance, and how it can best be achieved, have been the 
subject of keen debate. There are diverse concepts of 
good governance because the term is invariably nor-
mative. Criteria for assessing the quality of governance 
range from a relatively narrow focus on administra-
tive, technical and economic competence of specific 
institutions, notably of the state (World Bank 1994), 
to broader assessments of how well political systems, 
encompassing both state and non-state institutions, 
function as a whole (Grindle 2004). For example, the 
World Bank has emphasized the reform of the state 
as an enabler of economic growth and development, 
leading to a focus on reducing state corruption and 
strengthening public administration (Huther and 
Shah 1998; Ng and Yeats 1999; Wei 2000; Wolfowitz 
2006). Similarly, the Centre for Global Development 
has sought to measure “the quality of public adminis-
tration, business friendliness, and efficient allocation 
of public resources” (Becker et al. 2006, p. 1). The 
UN Development Programme (UNDP), in contrast, 
has adopted broader criteria for assessing good gov-
ernance as integral to state, market and civil society 
interaction:
Governance includes the state, but transcends it 
by taking in the private sector and civil society. 
All three are critical for sustaining human 
development. The state creates a conducive 
political and legal environment. The private 
sector generates jobs and income. And civil 
society facilitates political and social interaction 
- mobilising groups to participate in economic, 
social and political activities. Because each has 
weaknesses and strengths, a major objective of 
our support for good governance is to promote 
constructive interaction among all three” 
(UNDP 1997, Executive Summary).
An assessment of the substantial literature on good 
governance is beyond the scope of this analysis. In as-
sessing the linkages between global governance and 
the SDH, the following observations can be made. 
First, the initial emphasis on the need for good gover-
nance in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), 
largely promoted by international financial institu-
tions (IFIs), has broadened to acceptance that they 
are criteria to which all countries should aspire. Sec-
ond, governance concerns institutions across many 
different levels (from local to global), and aspirations 
of good governance should address multiple levels. 
Third, relatively narrow conceptualizations of good 
governance, focused on state institutions, have given 
way to recognition of the need for good governance 
in state and non-state institutions, including private 
companies (e.g. corporate governance) and civil soci-
ety organizations (CSOs). Fourth, there is widespread 
acceptance that the appropriate criteria for assessing 
good governance should extend beyond measures of 
administrative, technical and economic competence. 
Criteria concerning the functioning of legal systems, 
democratic institutions and processes, and the de-
velopment of civil society, have been added to policy 
debates (Leftwich 1994; AusAID 2000; Dobriansky 
2003). The eight criteria framework of the UN Eco-
nomic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
(ESCAP) is one example of broad-based principles 
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 Box 1.
ESCAP criteria for assessing 
good governance
The UN Economic and Social Commission for 
Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) identifies eight 
complementary goals as criteria for assessing 
good governance. The criteria are defined in the 
following ways:
Accountability - The requirement that officials 
answer to stakeholders on the disposal of their 
powers and duties, act on criticisms or requirements 
made of them and accept (some) responsibility for 
failure, incompetence or deceit. Accountability 
mechanisms can address the issues of both who 
holds office and the nature of decisions by those 
in office. Accountability requires freedom of 
information, stakeholders who are able to organize, 
and the rule of law (UNDP 1997). 
Transparency – The sharing of information and 
acting in an open manner. Transparency allows 
stakeholders to gather information that may be 
critical to uncovering abuses and defending 
their interests. Transparent systems have clear 
procedures for public decision-making, open 
channels of communication between stakeholders 
and officials, and access to a wide range of 
information (UNDP 1997).
Responsiveness - Institutions and processes try 
to serve all stakeholders within a reasonable 
timeframe (UNESCO 2005).
Effective and efficient - The capacity to realise 
organisational or individual objectives in a way 
that makes optimal use of available resources. 
Effectiveness requires competence; sensitivity 
and responsiveness to specific, concrete, human 
concerns; and the ability to articulate these concerns, 
formulate goals to address them and develop and 
implement strategies to realise these goals (UNDP 
1997).
Rule of law - Equal protection (of human rights) and 
punishment under the law. The rule of law reigns over 
government, protecting citizens against arbitrary 
state action, and over society generally, governing 
relations among private interests. It ensures that all 
citizens are treated equally and are subject to the 
law rather than to the whims of the powerful. The rule 
of law is an essential precondition for accountability 
and predictability in both the public and private 
sectors (UNDP 1997).
Equitable and inclusive - A society’s well being 
depends on ensuring that all its members have a 
recognised stake and are not excluded from the 
mainstream of society. This requires all groups, but 
particularly the most vulnerable, to have opportunities 
to improve or maintain their well-being (UNESCO 
2005).
Participatory - When group members have an 
adequate and equal opportunity to place questions 
on the agenda, and to express their preferences 
about the final outcome during decision-making. 
Participation could be either direct or through 
legitimate intermediate institutions or representatives. 
Participation needs to be informed and organized. 
This means freedom of association and expression on 
the one hand and an organized civil society on the 
other hand (UNDP 1997).
Consensus oriented - Mediation of the different 
interests in society to reach a broad consensus in 
society on what is in the best interest of the whole 
community and how this can be achieved (UNESCO 
2005).
(ESCAP criteria for assessing good governance cited 
in UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and 
the Pacific (ESCAP) 2006, p. 3)
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(Box 1) that, in our opinion, adequately captures the 
current terrain of good governance debates.
While the substantial attention to good governance in 
recent decades has increased and broadened emphasis 
given to such issues, Grindle (2004, p. 525) argues 
that efforts to apply these ideas to development have 
been “deeply problematic”:
The good governance agenda, largely defined by 
the international development community but 
often fervently embraced by domestic reformers, 
is unrealistically long and growing longer over 
time. Among the governance reforms that ‘must 
be done’ to encourage development and reduce 
poverty, there is little guidance about what’s 
essential and what’s not, what should come first 
and what should follow, what can be achieved 
in the short term and what can only be achieved 
over the longer term, what is feasible and what 
is not. (Grindle 2004, p. 526)
Akin to concerns about the achievability of good gov-
ernance in low- and middle-income countries, this 
paper recognizes the problems of rigorously applying 
good governance principles to emerging global gover-
nance institutions concerned with the SDH. There is 
uneven evidence of compliance to such principles and 
their attainability within and across relevant institu-
tions may be questioned.
1.3.3 Social determinants of health
The SDH concern the specific features of, and pathways 
by which, societal conditions affect health. Examples 
include the prevailing political structure, income, edu-
cation, occupation, family structure, service availability, 
sanitation, exposure to hazards, social support, racial 
discrimination, and access to resources linked to health 
(Marmot and Wilkinson 1999). Correspondingly, in-
adequate income, housing, and work environments are 
some of the SDH leading to health inequalities within 
and between countries (Wilkinson and Marmot 2003). 
In relation to health policy, the SDH focus on how so-
cietal conditions affect the health status of individuals, 
their ability to remain healthy and cope with illness 
and ill-health. While this includes such issues as access 
to health care and medical technologies, or the scope 
and use of public health interventions, the SDH do 
not deal strictly with medical and public health policies 
per se. Rather the focus is on the distribution of health 
(notably inequalities in health status) and differences 
in the ability to stay healthy.
Global governance issues related to the SDH are broad-
er in scope than such challenges as access to health care 
and essential medicines. Institutions can promote ac-
tions on the SDH, both within the confines of health-
related institutions and through institutions outside 
of the health sector concerned with economic, social, 
labour and food policies. Of concern, therefore, are the 
relative roles of a diverse range of global institutional 
actors in such policy sectors, and how they are gov-
erned.
In this respect, there is a broad range of global institu-
tions concerned with the SDH either directly or in-
directly. Most directly, institutions may address health 
issues explicitly, either as part of their core mandates 
(e.g. WHO, global health initiatives) or as an extension 
of them. Examples of the latter include the World Bank 
(development lending), WFP (emergency food relief ), 
FAO (food security), UNICEF (children), UNDP (de-
velopment) and UNFPA (population). In addition, in-
stitutions may impact on the SDH indirectly in their 
pursuit of non-health related activities. The policies of 
the Bretton Woods Institutions, for example, affect the 
world economy and policies in borrowing countries, 
and thus how different countries and populations fare 
within them. Similarly, trade liberalization under the 
auspices of the WTO may lead to positive or negative 
impacts on the employment prospects, working condi-
tions or poverty rates of particular populations, as well 
as on sectoral policies (e.g. in health services, education 
and water).
From this starting point, this paper reviews evidence 
available to assess global governance institutions con-
cerned with the SDH using a selection of the ESCAP 
principles of good governance. The principles applied 
are dependent on the availability of evidence for spe-
cific institutions. At present such evidence is limited, 
meaning that understanding the links between specific 
principles of good governance and individual SDH re-
mains beyond the scope of this paper. Thus, the paper 
identifies priorities for strengthening research on good 
governance and health. It also considers the linkages 
between global governance and the SDH in two ways.
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First, it is argued that the quality of governance (mea-
sured by good governance principles) of individual 
global institutions shapes the policy decisions and 
activities of those institutions. Are global institutions 
which practice good governance more likely and able 
to address the SDH? Can we find examples which of-
fer lessons for strengthening emerging institutions? 
Second, it is argued that how these institutions col-
lectively contribute to global governance influences 
the SDH. There is ample national level evidence that 
health depends not only, and not primarily, on medical 
care but also on political, economic and social inter-
ventions (Navarro and Muntaner 2004). For example, 
Reidpath and Allotey (2006) find that the quality of 
governance is a key “structural factor” for explaining 
population health outcomes including HIV preva-
lence. To what extent is the nature of the emerging 
architecture for global governance facilitating or hin-
dering efforts to address the SDH? What conclusions 
can we draw from the quality of global governance 
and efforts to address the SDH?
In summary, this paper argues that global governance is 
central to addressing the SDH within and across coun-
tries. Along with understanding what policies are im-
plemented or not to tackle poverty, housing, employ-
ment, and other needs (addressed in supporting GKN 
papers), it is critical to assess how global institutions 
make policy decisions collectively and individually.
1.4 Outline of paper
The remainder of this paper is organized into three 
main sections. Section 2 describes the emerging ar-
chitecture of global governance relevant to the SDH. 
Section 3 assesses this emerging architecture against 
selected good governance criteria, recognizing “[t]he 
dearth of knowledge and practical tools to help iden-
tify, describe, and address governance success and fail-
ures” (Salzburg Conference 2005, p. 15). Section 4 
draws conclusions and puts forth recommendations 
for strengthening global governance for the SDH. 
Examples of specific governance institutions and key 
issues are provided throughout to illustrate the main 
arguments.
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Globalization has affected global governance in four fundamental ways. First, it is shifting the 
distribution of power and authority among different 
levels of governance. Globalization challenges the ca-
pacity of national institutions to govern effectively 
(Wapner 1995; Finnemore 1996; Gilpin 2002).2  The 
result has been a growth in political and economic in-
teractions that seek to solve problems that affect more 
than one state or region. While formal authority may 
largely remain with sovereign states, the power and 
authority of institutions at the regional and global lev-
els have increased.
Second, government has traditionally delineated insti-
tutional authority and responsibility by sector, such as 
education, labour and health. Globalization is increas-
ing the causal connections across different sectors, and 
extending causal connections long recognized at the 
local/national levels to the global level. This requires 
forms of governance that facilitate multi-sectoral and 
multi-level action.3 In health, efforts have thus been 
made to develop approaches that cut across existing 
institutional boundaries to address issues of transna-
tional reach (Martin 2006), broad goals or themes (e.g. 
Millennium Development Goals, poverty alleviation, 
social exclusion) (van Hertena et al. 2001; Kickbusch 
2005). For example, efforts to tackle the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic have broadened from a biomedical focus to 
issues concerning inter alia human rights, poverty and 
gender.
Third, institutional actors are traditionally classi-
fied as belonging to the state, market or civil society 
(UNDP 1997). In principle state institutions hold 
formal power and authority in international relations, 
acting through intergovernmental bodies such as the 
UN. Globalization is changing the relative number 
of state, market and civil society actors (Krut 1997; 
Globalization, Global Governance and
the Social Determinants of Health:
A review of the linkages
and agenda for action
2.1 The emerging
architecture of global governance
 2  See Koivusalo M., Schrecker T. (2007), Economic globalization and national health policy space. Discussion Paper, Globalization Knowledge Network, WHO Commission 
on the Social Determinants of Health.  
 3  Ministers of Environment are in essence Ministers of Health. Environment News Service, June 17, 1999. http://ens.lycos.com/ens/jun99/1999L-06-17-06.html (accessed 
September 4, 1999)
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Weiss 1999), and the distribution of power and au-
thority among them. Of particular note is the growth 
in market-based (private sector) institutions, and their 
relative power within an emerging global political 
economy. The private sector comprises a diverse range 
of interests and institutions, from small-scale concerns 
such as local farmers and manufacturers, to large-scale 
global concerns such as transnational corporations 
(TNCs) whose operations can transcend national 
boundaries. Economic globalization is characterized 
by the growth of TNCs in number and relative size. 
There as been increased concentration of ownership 
within many sectors, such as food and drink, phar-
maceuticals, electronics, automotives, energy and 
telecommunications (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2004). 
This has given them sizeable resources and capacity to 
influence not only the world economy but also how it 
is regulated through institutions of global governance. 
Furthermore, in some cases TNCs have become di-
rect participants in global governance through insti-
tutional arrangements, notably global public-private 
partnerships (GPPPs) as discussed below. 
Similarly, diverse institutions comprising civil society 
have become more important with global governance 
(Walzer 1995; Price 2003). These institutions are de-
fined as the totality of voluntary civic and social orga-
nizations that form the basis of a functioning society 
as opposed to the force-backed structures of a state.4  
In health development and cooperation, civil society 
organizations (CSOs) have actively sought to influ-
ence policy change since the 1970s, playing an instru-
mental role in the adoption of the International Code 
on the Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (Richter 
2002) and the essential medicines list (WHO 2001). 
At the UN Conference on Population and Develop-
ment in 1994, the women’s health movement played a 
prominent role in preparations and deliberations, in-
fluencing the shift in focus from population control to 
reproductive health (Neidell 1998). Similarly, CSOs 
were active contributors to the negotiation process 
for the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
(FCTC) (see 2.1.1).
Notably new “hybrid” institutional actors have 
emerged as part of global governance, bringing to-
gether different combinations of state, market and 
civil society actors under innovative institutional ar-
rangements (Figure 1). Charitable (philanthropic) 
foundations straddle the private sector, where funding 
may originate, and civil society given their non-profit 
activities. Historically charitable foundations, such as 
the Rockefeller Foundation, boast an impressive re-
cord for supporting health development (Weindling 
1995), although they have not formally sought promi-
nent roles in official policy-making bodies. However, 
the scale of resources commanded by some founda-
tions today, and the corresponding increase in scale 
and scope of their activities, suggests unprecedented 
influence in global health governance. For example, 
the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation is among the 
three biggest donors to global health including its 
Grand Challenges in Global Health initiative (Table 
2) and contributions to the Global Alliance for Vac-
cines and Immunization (GAVI).
Since the early 1990s there has been a multitude of 
initiatives that bring together state, market and civil 
society actors, often referred to as global public-
private partnerships (GPPPs). In health these in-
clude the Global Forum for Health Research, GAVI, 
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Ma-
laria (GFATM), and Global Alliance for Improved 
Nutrition (GAIN). One of the key innovations of 
these organizations has been to involve for-profit or-
ganizations directly in decision-making, the appro-
priateness of which has been questioned (Koivusalo 
and Ollila 1997; Buse and Walt 2000; Ollila 2003; 
Zammit 2003; Richter 2004). There has also been in-
creased attention to new forms of management, with 
increased emphasis on results-based approaches such 
as payments for progress (Barder and Birdsall 2006), 
pilot funding, rapid measurable results, monitoring 
and evaluation, exit strategies, and implementation 
of and/or research on new technologies. There remain 
considerable concerns about the extent to which such 
approaches are appropriate to addressing the SDH, 
given their emphasis on short term and quantifiable 
measures.
Fourth, global governance in its emergent form has 
been characterized by shifts in, within and across 
 4  Definitions of civil society vary in whether for-profit organizations should be included. In this paper, for-profit organizations and those organizations representing their
 interests (e.g. industry associations) are categorised as private sector actors. Civil society organizations in this paper refer to not for-profit organizations (sometimes referred 
to as public interest organizations) only.
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countries and institutions, and resultant inequities 
in power and authority. Among institutions direct-
ly concerned with the SDH, the relative decline of 
WHO has been observed alongside the rise in prom-
inence of the World Bank through health sector 
lending since the 1980s, and the proliferation of GP-
PPs. Beyond the health sector, the increasing pow-
er of multilateral and regional trading systems, the 
OECD and Group of Eight (G8) can be compared 
with the corresponding decline of the UN Confer-
ence on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the 
Group of 775 and the non-aligned movement since 
the New International Economic Order (NIEO) de-
bates of the 1970s.6
2.1.1 Case study7: Framework Convention   
  on Tobacco Control
The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
(FCTC) was adopted in 2003 and, following ratifica-
tion by 40 states, entered into force in February 2005. 
As of September 15, 2006, 168 countries have signed 
the agreement and 139 have become parties following 
ratification. The achievement of the FCTC lies not 
only in becoming the first international health treaty, 
but also in the process by which the agreement was 
achieved among WHO’s 192 member states.
Pre-negotiation meetings were held regionally. Formal 
treaty negotiations were carried out through Interna-
tional Negotiating Body (INB) meetings held in Ge-
neva. Public hearings were held to enable a wide range 
of views to be expressed. Accreditation of .CSOs was 
facilitated by WHO which recognized the importance 
of their support, not only in supporting the negotia-
tion process, but also the subsequent signing, ratifica-
tion and implementation of the FCTC within mem-
ber states.
The influence of CSOs was enhanced significantly 
by the formation of the Framework Convention Al-
liance (FCA) comprised of more than 250 organiza-
tions representing over 90 countries. The FCA in-
cludes individual NGOs and organizations working 
at the local or national levels, as well as existing co-
alitions and alliances working at national, regional, 
and international levels. The vision of the FCA is a 
world free of death and disease caused by tobacco. Its 
mission is to promote and support a global network 
for coordinated international campaigning against 
tobacco; developing tobacco control capacity, par-
ticularly in developing countries; and carrying out 
effectively the watchdog function for the Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control. It was created to 
support the development, ratification, and imple-
mentation of WHO’s FCTC. It was formed out of 
two needs. One was to improve communication 
among groups already engaged in work around the 
FCTC process. The other was for a more systematic 
outreach to NGOs not yet engaged in the process, 
particularly in developing countries, that could both 
benefit from and contribute to the creation of an ef-
fective FCTC (Collin et al. 2002).
Organized around the FCA, CSOs were permitted to 
submit statements following each negotiation session. 
While not entirely satisfying, it was an advance on 
UN formal negotiations restricted to member states. 
The views of CSOs were deemed especially important 
to counter efforts by some governments, notably the 
US, Germany and Japan, to weaken tobacco control 
measures within the treaty. For example, the Japanese 
government, which owns half of Japan Tobacco Inter-
national, successfully argued for extensive optional lan-
guage (e.g. “appropriate measures”) that seriously weak-
ened the FCTC (Assunta and Chapman 2006). In turn 
CSOs presented briefings on specific issues between 
 5  The Group of 77 countries was founded in 1964 as a loose coalition of LMICs designed to promote its members’ collective economic interests, and create an enhanced joint
 negotiating capacity at the UN.  There were 77 founding members, with membership since expanding to 132.  The G77 is modeled on the Group of 7 (now G8)
countries.
 6  The New International Economic Order (NIEO) was a set of proposals put forward during the 1970s by LMICs at UNCTAD to promote improved terms of trade, debt 
relief, development assistance, tariff reductions and other means. The Declaration for the Establishment of a NIEO, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1974, sought 
to replace the Bretton Woods system with one more favourable to the developing world. Along with the declaration, a Programme of Action and a Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties of States were also adopted.
 7  Throughout this paper we refer to “case studies.” We do not use this term in a methodological sense, which would imply triangulation of multiple data sources, including 
primary data. Time and resources precluded this level of systematic review and analysis. Rather, these are vignettes or “case stories,” in which a reasonable though not 
exhaustive review of evidence and arguments pertaining to the case is used with the particular purpose of shedding light on how the example illustrates (or does not) 
good governance criteria, and with what known or likely effects on the SDH. Different authors of this paper have familiarity with the larger literature base on most of these 
cases. Together with the partial evidence cited, this allows us, with some confidence, to draw some lessons from each case, though we acknowledge that these lessons remain 
interpretive rather than definitive.
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Figure 1:  Selected global institutions impacting on 
    the social determinants of health
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negotiation sessions, as well as lobbied delegates. While 
these efforts were critical for catalyzing many govern-
ments into regional coalitions, notably in Africa and 
Asia, they did not wholly counter those governments 
opposed to stronger tobacco control measures.
Since the adoption of the treaty, the FCA and CSOs 
in general have continued to serve as a coordinating 
body for supporting the signing and ratification of the 
treaty. For example, in Central and Eastern Europe, 
and the former Soviet Union, Malinowska-Sempruch 
et al. (2006) find that CSOs have led efforts to iden-
tify direct and indirect health consequences of tobacco 
use. The FCA has also helped disseminate information 
about implementation of the FCTC, notably in low- 
and middle-income countries (FCA 2006).
The lessons from this case study are that a well-organized 
network of activist CSOs, which is able to gain official 
standing in multilateral negotiations, has an opportunity 
to argue effectively in favour of measures supporting the 
SDH in pertinent agreements. If CSOs mobilize and act 
strategically, they can exert influence through both formal 
and informal mechanisms.
 
2.1.2 Case Study: Grand Challenges in Global Health
The Grand Challenges for Global Health initiative was 
announced in 2003 on the basis of a US$200 million 
grant by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation for 
health research in LMICs. The initiative is a partner-
ship between the Gates Foundation and the Founda-
tion for the US National Institutes of Health (NIH), 
which “facilitates public-private partnerships of all 
sizes and configurations”.8 Following a global call for 
ideas, in October 2003 the initiative’s Scientific Board 
identified 14 challenges (see Table 1) that would be 
the topic of a call for proposals (Varmus et al. 2003). 
In May 2005 the Gates Foundation added a further 
US$250 million in funding. In June 2005 the initia-
tive announced grants to 43 research projects.9
Despite the welcome funding for global health, the 
initiative raises two important governance questions. 
First, the challenges are heavily biomedical and bio-
statistical, with little attention to the SDH and the 
policies that affect them. The initiative’s original call 
for ideas noted that: “Although there are enormous 
challenges that relate to poverty, access to health in-
terventions, and delivery systems in developing coun-
tries, this initiative is focused on the grand scientific 
and technological research challenges in health”.10 
Second, the initiative focuses on communicable dis-
ease treatment and control, although the importance 
of “chronic noncommunicable disorders and…under-
lying living conditions” are acknowledged (Varmus et 
al. 2003, p. 399).
One critique of the initiative to date faults its disre-
gard of the SDH, and proposes an alternative set of 
challenges as three goals (Table 2), which would “inte-
grate social and medical/technical means of improving 
global health” (Birn 2005, p. 517). A similar criticism 
is made by Litzow and Bauchner (2006, p. 173) who 
write, “the issues of poor infrastructure, insufficient 
healthcare delivery systems, and political instability re-
main significant causes of child mortality and are not 
addressed nor supported by the Grand Challenges.” 
The medical/technical and the SDH approaches are 
not mutually exclusive. The reorientation of medical 
research to take greater account of neglected diseases11  
has repeatedly been stressed by the health and develop-
ment communities (UNDP 1999; Global Forum for 
Health Research 2004; Chirac and Torreele; 2006). 
While the Challenges lack of an explicit mandate to 
consider the broader SDH context in which techno-
logical advances are made available, they reinforce a 
separation between basic health knowledge and ap-
plied health services delivery.
A second criticism is that the initiative, financed al-
most entirely by private wealth, raises accountability, 
responsiveness, equity and representational issues. 
Even before the recent windfall to the Foundation 
from Warren Buffet, Kickbusch and Payne (2004, 
p. 11) describe it as “a scandal of global health gov-
ernance that WHO member states…would allow a 
situation to arise in which a private philanthropy, the 
 8  Foundation for the National Institutes of Health. http://www.fnih.org/aboutus/aboutus.shtml (accessed September 9. 2006)
 9  For summaries of the projects see http://www.gcgh.org/sitemap.aspx?SecID=300 (accessed September 9, 2006).
 10  Grand Challenges in Global Health. http://www.icgeb.trieste.it/GENERAL/IntResGrant.htm (accessed September 9, 2006)
 11  Neglected diseases, or diseases of the poor, are defined by Caines (2004) as those which principally affect poor people in poor countries for which health interventions, and
 research and development, are seen as inadequate to the need.
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Gates Foundation, has more money to spend on global 
health than the regular budget of their own organiza-
tion.” In part the problem arises from the multiplica-
tion of initiatives which they argue balkanize global 
public health. However, it also represents a shift of the 
locus of priority setting away from governments that 
are, in more and more countries, at least minimally 
accountable to their citizens. This is not a process dis-
tinctive to the Grand Challenges initiative, but a com-
mon characteristic of many GPPPs.
Table 1:  The 14 Grand Challenges for Global Health 
Goal Grand Challenge
To improve childhood vaccines 1. Create effective single-dose vaccines 
that can be used soon after birth
2. Prepare vaccines that do 
not require refrigeration
3. Develop needle-free delivery 
systems for vaccines
To create new vaccines 4. Devise reliable tests in model systems 
to evaluate live attenuated vaccines
5. Solve how to design antigens for 
effective, protective immunity
6. Learn which immunological responses 
provide protective immunity
To control insects that 
transmit agents of disease
7. Develop a genetic strategy to 
deplete or incapacitate a disease-
transmitting insect population
8. Develop a chemical strategy to 
deplete or incapacitate a disease-
transmitting insect population
To improve nutrition to promote health 9. Create a full range of optimal 
bio-available nutrients in a 
single staple plant species
To improve drug treatment 
of infectious diseases
10. Discover drugs and delivery 
systems that minimize the likelihood 
of drug-resistant microorganisms
To cure latent and chronic infections 11. Create therapies that can 
cure latent infections
12. Create immunological methods 
that can cure chronic infections
To measure disease and 
health status accurately and 
economically in poor countries
13. Develop technologies that 
permit quantitative assessment 
of population health status
14. Develop technologies that allow 
assessment of individuals for multiple 
conditions or pathogens at point-of-care
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The lesson learned from this case study is that the rela-
tive scale of private philanthropy today is increasingly 
allowing such organisations to set the global health 
policy agenda. This includes, not only what interven-
tions are supported, but also the research agenda which 
shapes available interventions. Given current priorities 
identified by leading philanthropic organisations, an 
over reliance on such funding risks a singularly tech-
nology-driven, biomedically-centred approach, rather 
than one that simultaneously supports policies and new 
knowledge that more effectively deals with equity and 
the SDH. In particular, the prominence given to phil-
anthropic global health research funding risks obscuring 
the important political discourse on globalization’s im-
pacts on the SDH, and how to minimize health inequi-
ties arising from these impacts.
Table 2:  Alternative grand challenges for global health 
Source: Reprinted from The Lancet, 366, Birn AE, Gate’s grandest challenge: transcending technology as public health ideology, 514-519, Copyright 2005, 
with permission from Elsevier.
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2.2 Health-focused global institutions and the SDH
There is a range of institutions at the global level 
whose mandates are ostensibly focused on health-re-
lated issues. Historically the World Health Organiza-
tion (WHO) has played a lead role as the UN special-
ized agency for health since its creation in 1948 (see 
2.2.1). Other UN organizations subsequently estab-
lished have included health issues as part of broader 
mandates concerning children (UNICEF), agricul-
ture/food (WFP, FAO, IFAD), population (UNFPA), 
and development (UNDP). Through these mandates, 
themselves the subjects of debate over how narrowly 
or broadly they should be, specific initiatives have 
been relevant to the SDH. Examples include UNI-
CEF’s campaign on child poverty (UNICEF 2005), 
UNDP’s work on global trade (Malhotra 2002), and 
UNFPA’s promotion of gender equality (Microcre-
dit Summit Campaign/UNFPA 2005). In addition, 
UNICEF examined the health effects of structural 
adjustment programs and globalization during the 
1980s (Cornia et al. 1987). The ILO Programme on 
Safety and Health at Work and the Environment, and 
its activities concerning social security and health in-
surance12, are relevant here, as was its facilitation of 
the World Commission on the Social Dimension of 
Globalization (2004). Hsiao and Heller (2007) have 
produced a primer that aims to provide IMF macro-
economists with the essential information they need 
to address issues concerning health sector policy, par-
ticularly when they have significant macroeconomic 
implications. They write that such issues can also af-
fect equity and growth, and are fundamental to any 
strategy of poverty reduction.
In general, a brief review of these initiatives suggest 
that, while the SDH are recognized as important, the 
solutions put forth have focused on selected health care 
interventions to alleviate health consequences, rather 
than measures to address the multiple pathways by 
which social conditions influence health outcomes.13  
The WHO Commission on Macroeconomics and 
Health, for example, undertook substantial work to 
demonstrate the importance of health to economic 
growth as a basis for increasing financing for health 
development (WHO 2002). However, the commis-
sion gave little attention to analysing the impact of 
macroeconomic policies on health. This suggests a 
tendency for health-focused institutions to propose 
solutions and actions that fall within specific, often 
biomedically-inscribed mandates, rather than recom-
mendations more dependent on activities of other 
organizations. This tendency may be understandable 
from an institutional perspective, in terms of focusing 
activities and avoiding “mandate creep” (Koivusalo 
2003), but hinders the production of an evidentiary 
base and policy recommendations for addressing the 
SDH.
Beyond the UN system a variety of health-focused 
initiatives have joined the global governance scene, 
varying in the degree to which they seek to address 
the SDH. Many of the GPPPs formed since the mid 
1990s, such as GAVI and GFATM, are disease-focused 
(Buse and Walt 2000). As another example, GAIN is 
focused on nutrition, notably vitamin and mineral 
supplementation. As new initiatives, they have attract-
ed public attention to specific causes, such as the need 
for certain technologies (e.g. vaccines, supplements), 
the neglect of specific diseases, gaps in global health re-
search (Global Forum for Health Research, see 2.2.2) 
or the plight of certain populations. The limited anal-
yses of GPPPs to date have raised concerns about their 
vertical (disease-focused) approach, longer-term sus-
tainability, undermining of local health systems, ca-
pacity to achieve measurable results, and contribution 
to fragmenting global health governance.14 Critical re-
flection on the good governance of GPPPs continues 
to be outpaced by their creation and operation.
Overall health-focused organizations in global gover-
nance have in principle the goal of affecting health 
processes and outcomes as their core mandates. Tradi-
tionally such organizations are closely linked to health 
care systems and may be focused on prevention, con-
trol and treatment of diseases. However, beyond a 
 12  For example, the GTZ-ILO-WHO-Consortium on Social Health Protection in Developing Countries aims to address the problem of poor access to health services and
 catastrophic health expenditures through the creation of sustainable systems of social protection in health.
 13  By this we mean the pathways identified in the background paper by Solar and Irwin (2005, revised 2006), i.e. social stratification, risk exposure, vulnerability, and
 differential access to services.
 14  See Hanefield J., Spicer N., Brugha R., Walt G. (2007), “How have global health initiatives impacted on health equity?” Health Systems Knowledge Network, WHO
 Commission on the Social Determinants of Health.
26      Globalization and Health Knowledge Network Globalization, Global Governance and the Social Determinants of Health     27
disease-based orientation, some health-focused orga-
nizations have tried to influence the SDH through ad-
vocacy and multi-sectoral activities. Collectively there 
are clear tensions within and across organizations on 
what should be the priorities in health development 
and how they should best be achieved. In general, at-
tention to the SDH has increased somewhat within 
some organizations but remains challenged by a con-
tinued emphasis on biomedical and vertical approach-
es to health.
2.2.1 Case study: World Health Organization
WHO was created in 1948 as the UN specialized 
agency for health. It is one of a family of organizations 
formed to address functional areas of international 
concern, such as food and agriculture, labour and ed-
ucation. UN organizations concerned with economic 
and social work are coordinated by the Economic and 
Social Council (ECOSOC)15 under the overall au-
thority of the UN General Assembly. WHO itself was 
formed from a number of pre-existing regional health 
organizations, as well as the largely defunct Health 
Organization of the League of Nations and Office 
International d’Hygiène Publique. Its formation also 
came from a long history of international health coop-
eration dating from the 19th century.
The WHO’s governance structure reflects this institu-
tional history, as well as the need to reconcile the di-
verse interests of its 192 member states with the goals 
of protecting and promoting health worldwide. The 
World Health Assembly (WHA) is the plenary and 
legislative body of WHO, held each year in May to 
allow representation by all member states. Decision-
making is governed by the one-member, one-vote 
rule, although decisions are largely taken by consensus 
rather than vote. The Executive Board (EB) is the ex-
ecutive that oversees the implementation of decisions 
taken by the WHA. Importantly, while EB member 
states are appointed by the WHA, following nomina-
tion by six regional committees, individuals serving 
in the it are expected to serve in a personal capacity 
as “technically qualified in the field of health” rather 
than as representatives of particular governments. EB 
members serve three year terms, and each year one-
third of members are retired. Initially consisting of 18 
members, by 2007 the EB had grown to 32. It meets 
twice annually, in January and after the WHA.
Headed by the Director-General, WHO’s Secretariat 
is the administrative and technical organ, responsible 
for implementing the organization’s activities. It con-
sists of a headquarters in Geneva, six regional offices 
and country offices in selected member states. The 
regional offices are unique within the UN system in 
terms of their independence and decision-making 
powers, due to the prior existence of certain regional 
bodies (e.g. Pan American Health Organization) and 
to the belief that a decentralized structure was needed 
to effectively carry out WHO’s work. In practice the 
appropriate balance among headquarters, regional and 
country level activities has been the subject of ongoing 
debate (Lee 1998).
The WHO Constitution (1948) provides the organi-
zation with a variety of instruments for directing and 
coordinating international cooperation ranging from 
binding treaties and conventions to agreed regula-
tions, standards and recommendations. To date WHO 
has only once exercised its strongest legal authority, a 
binding treaty, in the form of the FCTC. Also the re-
vision of the International Health Regulations (IHR) 
in 2005, which enter into force in 2007, strengthens 
WHO’s legal standing on infectious disease control. 
However, as Fidler (2005b) notes, international laws 
and regulations concerning public health have largely 
developed outside the auspices of WHO in recent 
years, notably within multilateral trade agreements 
(see 3.3.3).
During its initial years, WHO pursued a largely dis-
ease-focused work program, with its staff overwhelm-
ingly trained in the biomedical sciences. By the late 
1960s the limitations of such an approach became 
evident with the failure of the malaria eradication pro-
gram (Walt 1993; Siddiqi 1995). The Health for All 
(HFA) strategy and Alma Ata conference on primary 
health care sought to shift emphasis from a vertical 
(disease-focused) to horizontal (systems-based) ap-
proach. While a valuable advocacy tool for addressing 
the broad determinants of health, this approach faced 
 15  ECOSOC has 54 members, elected by the General Assembly for three-year terms. It meets throughout the year and holds a major session in July, during which a high-level 
meeting of Ministers discusses major economic, social and humanitarian issues.
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operational challenges in implementation (Irwin and 
Scali 2005). Further attention to the broad determi-
nants of health came with the first International Con-
ference on Health Promotion in 1986, and held every 
four years since (Kickbusch 2003; Koivusalo et al. 
2006).
The ongoing tension between the vertical and hori-
zontal approaches (Lee 2004) was also evident in 
efforts to tackle the HIV/AIDS pandemic. In 1986 
WHO became the first international organization to 
concertedly address HIV/AIDS, and its approach was 
initially heavily biomedical. The creation of the Joint 
UN Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) in 1994 
followed in the wake of disagreement within WHO, 
and between WHO and other UN organizations, on 
whether the disease should be framed as a biomedi-
cal or development issue. UNAIDS was based on the 
latter approach, and encompassed concerns about hu-
man rights, equity and social justice. By the end of the 
1990s HIV/AIDS had gained prominence as a health, 
development and even security issue (Feldbaum et al., 
2006), and began to be discussed in an even wider 
range of forums including the UN Security Coun-
cil, G8 and World Economic Forum (WEF). Ironi-
cally, despite broader attention, recent global disease 
initiatives are characterized by a focus on biomedical 
interventions (e.g. the 3 by 5 initiative) and a shift 
away from broader development goals (Koivusalo and 
Ollila 2001; Ollila 2005). Despite recognition of the 
need for more diverse expertise, notably in economics 
and other social sciences, WHO staff remain heavily 
biomedical in expertise (Peabody 1995; Siddiqi 1995; 
Ruger and Yach 2005). Again we emphasize that these 
approaches are not dichotomies, but the present dis-
ease- and treatment-specific focuses risk a less balanced 
approach to ensuring equity in health outcomes.
A study by the One World Trust concluded that in-
tergovernmental organizations, like WHO, can face 
demands from different stakeholder groups and are 
judged against potentially conflicting measures of ac-
countability. These include: “whether they serve the 
interests of their member states; whether they serve 
the purposes for which they were established; and how 
their impact compares to evolving standards of ben-
efits and harms” (Blagescu and Lloyd 2006, p. 18). 
In principle, WHO is accountable to all its member 
states through the WHA and EB.  In practice, due 
to their greater resources and thus capacity to con-
tribute extra-budgetary funds for named activities or 
staff, industrialized countries exert far more influence, 
shaping the organization’s work program, resource 
allocation, decision-making procedures and staffing 
(Vaughan et al. 1995; Shiffman 2006; Lee and Buse 
2006). Where WHO has challenged powerful eco-
nomic interests in such countries, such as the sugar 
and tobacco industries (Zeltner et al. 2000; Elperin 
2003), the organization has faced reduced funding or 
risked becoming sidelined by alternative forums cre-
ated by major donor countries (Kapp 2001; Boseley 
2003; Simon 2005). The need for WHO to address 
organizational shortfalls has been acknowledged, but 
can also be used to disguise political pressures exerted 
by major donors seeking to protect their interests.
The lesson learned from this case study is that if multilat-
eral organizations, particularly but not exclusively WHO, 
are to be effective policy ‘knowledge banks’ for actions on 
the SDH, core funding support for their activities must 
be separated from the pressures of donor countries.16 This 
applies particularly in the case of the SDH, which are 
intersectoral as well as intergovernmental, and thus more 
prone to conflicting stakeholder pressures. Organizations 
must also have the appropriate “skills mix” to tackle the 
SDH which, at present, they largely lack given a contin-
ued focus on biomedical staff.
2.2.2 Case study:  Global Forum for Health Research
In 1990 the Commission on Health Research for 
Development estimated that less than 10 per cent 
of the world’s health resources were being applied to 
90 per cent of the world’s health problems. While it 
is not possible to make such an estimate today, the 
expression “10/90 gap” has passed into popular use 
as shorthand for the global inequalities in health re-
search, and as a rallying call for more attention to the 
neglected areas of health research. The Global Forum 
for Health Research (GFHR) was founded in 1998 to 
promote research funding into neglected diseases and 
conditions that comprise the major burden of disease 
 16  The issue of pressures from donor countries is dealt with in a separate paper, see Taylor, S., (2007) “Aid and Health,” Discussion Paper, Globalization Knowledge Network,
 WHO Commission on the Social Determinants of Health .
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in developing countries. Its activities include tracking 
resources at global and national levels, priority set-
ting and capacity building for health research and the 
identification of research agendas. As well as produc-
ing a range of annual and biennial publications that 
highlight progress and advocate for the closure of gaps 
in health research for development, it also convenes 
an annual conference. Forum 10, held in Cairo, took 
place in November 2006 on the theme “Combating 
Disease and Promoting Health.”
Registered as a Swiss foundation, the GFHR repre-
sents a new form of global governance: it is a stake-
holder or partner organization and not a member 
organization. Its governing body, the Foundation 
Council, comprises a cross-section of governments, 
multilateral and bilateral agencies, foundations, 
policy makers and research institution leaders from 
developing countries, the private sector, civil soci-
ety organizations and media. Informally the GFHR 
encourages collaboration across a wider spectrum of 
research groups and agencies, individual research-
ers and NGOs. Accountability and transparency in 
decision-making at the GFHR is affected through 
regular meetings of the Foundation Council (twice 
yearly) and the Council’s Strategic and Technical 
Advisory Committee (three times yearly). Together 
they review and approve all activities of the organiza-
tion; and publication of its biennial ‘10/90 Report 
on Health Research’ and other publications that re-
port on its activities relative to its goals. The GFHR’s 
website provides details of the Foundation Council 
membership, as well as access to all its publications. 
Financial support for the GFHR’s secretariat in 2005 
was provided by the Rockefeller Foundation, WHO, 
the World Bank and the governments of Canada, 
Denmark, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Sweden and 
Switzerland.
The GFHR web-site identifies health research 
broadly, encompassing: “biomedical research into 
new drugs, vaccines and diagnostics; to health sys-
tems and policy research which ensures that health 
systems are better informed and managed, to so-
cial science and operational research to improve ac-
cess and uptake and to help us better understand 
what affects the health and the choices of people 
in the community”.17 The social determinants of 
health are not explicit in this list, but are implied. 
The metaphor of the ‘10/90’ gap, however, directs 
attention primarily to disease-specific interven-
tions, those health system requirements necessary 
for efficient delivery and those facets of social life 
that might predict efficacy and effectiveness. These 
concerns have also been reflected in the majority 
of papers and posters presented at the annual fo-
rums, although each year there appears to be more 
plenary and session topics addressing the broader 
social determinants.18 The first formal external eval-
uation of the GFHR’s activities was undertaken in 
2000-2001 and the second external evaluation was 
completed in 2006. The GFHR’s most visible indi-
cator of success lay in its tracking of resource flows 
for health research.
The lesson learned from this case study is that, while a 
speculative inference only, the trajectory of the GFHR’s 
agenda from a primary focus on diseases and medical 
interventions, into a more pluralistic concern with the 
SDH reflects that of many international health organiza-
tions. This is due, in part, to the increasing presence and 
organization of global health researchers/activists who 
have supported a broader SDH agenda.
2.3 Non health-focused global 
institutions and the SDH
Non health-focused institutions are concerned with 
a wide range of issue-areas that indirectly affect the 
SDH. These institutions may address specific health 
issues, as part of their mandates concerning, for ex-
ample, trade and investment, education, housing, or 
employment. They also influence the SDH through 
the pursuit of these core mandates. The most impor-
tant non health-related institutions in global gover-
nance, in terms of impacts on the SDH, are those con-
cerned with governance of the world economy. These 
are led by the IFIs (see 2.3.1) and WTO, and their 
regional counterparts, along with the OECD and G8 
(see 2.3.2).
 17  FAQ, http://www.globalforumhealth.org/Site/001__Who%20we%20are/004__FAQs.php (accessed September 22, 2006)
 18  This assessment is based on one of the authors’ (RL) participation in the past three Forums, a cursory examination of the titles of forum presentations, and comments made
 by several delegates to the author during Forum 9. The 2005 publication, Global Forum Update on Research for Health, Volume 2: Poverty, Equity and Health Research also
 presented, as its title indicates, a number of articles on global research, social determinants of health, and vulnerable populations.
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The manner in which the SDH is influenced by non 
health-based institutions is dependent on a number of 
factors. First, there appears to be no or minimal legal 
obligations for these institutions to consider health 
and its broad determinants. The development of in-
ternational human rights law could inform a strength-
ening of global governance for the SDH (see 3.6.2), 
although human rights treaties are binding on states 
parties and not on multilateral institutions per se.  It 
may be argued that human rights instruments impose 
obligations on global institutions indirectly by way of 
obligations binding the member states of these insti-
tutions to citizens’ rights in their own and in other 
countries (Hunt 2005d; Hunt 2006b). This argument 
has been advanced with respect to the WTO and its 
member states. However, Fidler (2005a) notes that in-
ternational trade law, including aspects directly related 
to health, is more developed than international health 
law. He points to the problematic revision of the In-
ternational Health Regulations (IHR), a slow and 
delayed process until its eventual agreement in 2005. 
Unlike most international obligations including hu-
man rights treaties, WTO agreements are also backed 
by sanctions, so there is a risk that the agreements will 
be given greater weight in the policy decisions of na-
tional governments. Furthermore, trade relations are 
often asymmetrical in that they take place between 
more and less economically powerful countries, and 
sanctions that may arise from them therefore have 
inequitable consequences across countries (Birdsall 
2006; Stiglitz and Charlton 2004).
Second, to what extent are health objectives compat-
ible with their mandates and declared goals? Avail-
able analyses suggest that there are some measures to 
protect health within certain multilateral trade agree-
ments (MTAs), such as the clarifications provided by 
the Doha Declaration and Paragraph 6 decision for the 
TRIPS agreement (Bloche 2002). The asbestos dispute 
between the EU and Canada also suggests there are 
flexibilities for health protection (Ranson et al. 2002; 
Koivusalo 2003). However, the scope for applying these 
flexibilities may depend on how such key concepts as 
“public health emergency”, “least trade restrictive” and 
“sufficient scientific evidence” are interpreted (Wood-
ward 2005). The beef hormone dispute between the EU 
and US suggest stringent interpretation of the standard 
of scientific evidence needed to uphold a ban (see also 
Box 2: SPS and the EU ban on hormone-treated beef ). 
Similar concerns are raised by the WTO decision on the 
case brought by the US, Canada and Argentina ruling 
against stringent EU regulation of GMOs. Moreover, 
there remains limited analysis of the health protection 
available under the growing number of regional and bi-
lateral trade agreements in force which create so-called 
WTO-plus measures.19
Limited attention has been given to the impact of 
MTAs on the SDH. For example, the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) has been the subject of controversy because 
of its impact on access to medicines.20 Drugs protected 
by patent are sold at higher prices, making them less 
affordable to the poor, thus contributing to health in-
equalities. Despite official claims that efforts have been 
made to resolve the sometimes competing objectives of 
trade liberalization and health development through 
the Doha Declaration and Paragraph 6 decision, the 
relevance of these provisions remains limited. Further-
more, concerns remain over the focus, narrowness and 
applicability of the Paragraph 6 decision. This is further 
complicated by the shift to regional and bilateral trade 
agreements which give health objectives even less pro-
tection under so-called TRIPS-plus measures. 
Alongside trade agreements, it is important to note 
the role of standards-setting bodies and, in particu-
lar, the degree to which efforts to tackle the SDH are 
represented within them. One example is the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission (or Codex), a joint body 
created by WHO and FAO in 1963 “to develop food 
standards, guidelines and related texts such as codes of 
practice”.21 In 1995, as part of the Uruguay Round of 
trade negotiations under the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the Codex was changed to 
a binding regulatory body which elevated its status as 
a standards setting body. On the one hand, critics ar-
gue that the excessive and dominant role of large-scale 
 19  See Blouin C., Bhushan A., Murphy S., Warren B. (2007), “Trade liberalisation,” Discussion Paper, Globalization Knowledge Network, WHO Commission on the Social 
Determinants of Health.
 20  See Correa C. (2007), “Intellectual Property Rights and Inequalities in Health Outcomes,” Discussion Paper, Globalization Knowledge Network, WHO Commission on the 
Social Determinants of Health.
 21  See http://www.codexalimentarius.net/web/index_en.jsp.
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commercial producers has led to the setting of standards 
too low to adequately protect consumers. Alternative-
ly, there may be an incentive to set standards at a high 
enough level that they can meet (by virtue of the scale of 
their operations, access to capital and technology, etc.) 
but higher than small producers can meet, thus bolster-
ing their competitive position and posing economic 
risks for small-scale producers which would struggle to 
meet them. A key point this raises is that optimizing 
the health effects of trade (or other international) poli-
cies requires a holistic view, taking into account both 
direct (biomedical) and indirect (SDH) health effects. 
A purely economic view in favour of deregulation will 
result in standards that are too low. A purely biomedical 
view may set them too high. This represents a strong 
case for raising the profile of SDH relative to both, and 
of institutionalizing this in the global governance sys-
tem, especially where it applies to bilateral, regional and 
global trade rules.
A more promising link with the SDH is the inclusion of 
health issues within broader development initiatives. At 
the World Summit for Social Development (see 2.3.1) 
in 1995, governments reached consensus on “the need 
to put people at the centre of development.” The Co-
penhagen Declaration adopted 10 commitments cen-
tral to the SDH, including poverty reduction, full em-
ployment and social integration. These commitments 
have been reaffirmed at two follow up meetings held in 
2000 and 2005, although many remain concerned as to 
the true political priority given to fulfilling them. These 
commitments have been largely subsumed by the health 
goals included within the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs), intended as a framework for targeting 
development assistance in key priorities (see 2.3.2). The 
MDGs provide a potential, so far unproven, tool for ad-
dressing the SDH, with three of its goals explicitly ad-
dressing health, and an additional four goals related to 
the broader social determinants of health.
Third, to what extent are there a sound evidence base 
and the potential for feasible action linking a non-health 
policy domain with the SDH? Over the past decade 
there have been mostly unheeded efforts to draw at-
tention to the social impacts of globalization, includ-
ing health. For example, the ILO established the World 
Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization 
(see 2.3.3) whose final report, A Fair Globalization: Cre-
ating Opportunities for All is “an attempt to help break 
the current impasse by focusing on the concerns and 
aspirations of people and on the ways to better harness 
the potential of globalization itself” (ILO 2004, p. ix).  
The vision put forth by the Commission is:
a process of globalization with a strong social 
dimension based on universally shared values, 
and respect for human rights and individual 
dignity; one that is fair, inclusive, democratically 
governed and provides opportunities and tangible 
benefits for all countries and people (ILO 2004, 
p. ix).
The World Social Forum (WSF) also sought to chal-
lenge current forms of globalization (see 2.3.4). It is de-
scribed as:
an open meeting place for reflective thinking, 
democratic debate of ideas, formulation of 
proposals, free exchange of experiences and 
inter-linking for effective action, by groups and 
movements of civil society that are opposed to 
neo-liberalism and to domination of the world 
by capital and any form of imperialism, and are 
committed to building a society centred on the 
human person” (World Social Forum n.d.).
In addition, there is now a substantive body of empirical 
evidence analyzing the impact of globalization on such 
social consequences as poverty, labour market restruc-
turing, income inequalities, physical environments, 
health systems, and financial flows (Pangestu 2001; Lee 
and Vivarelli 2006; Labonté and Schrecker in press a-c). 
Health has also been included in research and policy dis-
cussions based on the concept of global public goods.
2.3.1 Case study: The IMF and World Bank 
The IMF and World Bank play a critical role in 
providing and catalyzing external financing for 
developing countries, and in the prevention and 
resolution of debt and financial crises, which have 
had major effects on SDH in recent decades.22 Ad-
 22  See Taylor S. (2007), op.cit; and Rowson M. (2007) “Globalization, debt and poverty reduction strategies,” Discussion Paper, Globalization Knowledge Network, 
 WHO Commission on Social Determinants of Health.
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ditionally the nature of their response to debt and 
financial crises, and the conditions attached to their 
loans, give them considerable influence over policy-
making processes in many developing countries, 
over an extended period in the case of most low-
income countries. 
The Fund and Bank are also major sources and com-
missioners of research, the Bank having consciously 
established a role as a self-styled “Knowledge Bank” 
since 1996 (Cohen and Laporte 2004).23 Com-
bined with the considerable financial and human 
resources at their disposal, this gives them a major 
role in establishing the prevailing political and in-
tellectual ethos of development. As a result, they 
have considerable influence over the evolution of 
key economic variables with major implications for 
the SDH, such as household incomes and poverty 
and the level and allocation of government expen-
diture, and over policies in sectors of critical impor-
tance to health such as health services and educa-
tion. The nature of their roles in these areas, the way 
in which they carry them out, and the effectiveness 
with which they do so, are closely linked to their re-
spective governance structures This confers on these 
institutions considerable importance as a driving 
force behind the evolution of the SDH in develop-
ing countries.
The IMF and World Bank’s governance structures are 
characterized by a system in which countries’ votes 
are weighted according to their economic strength. 
This means that decision-making is dominated by 
industrialized countries, which have around 60 per 
cent of the votes (compared with 16 per cent of 
world population), although the institutions’ policies 
and activities impact overwhelmingly on developing 
countries. Accountability to the membership, par-
ticularly to developing countries and to civil society, 
is further undermined by a number of other factors, 
including:
• the constituency system (whereby eight 
countries have their own Executive Directors, 
while the remaining 16 Directors are 
“elected” by groups of between four and 
24 member countries), and the inability of 
Directors representing constituencies to split 
their votes
• no formal obligation on Directors to reflect 
the views of the governments or interests 
of the countries they represent, and thus 
the absence of effective mechanisms for 
accountability
• the failure to make draft decisions or support-
ing documents publicly available until deci-
sions have been approved
• the secrecy of Executive Board discussions 
• the absence of formal votes in the Executive 
Board (where substantive discussions occur), 
so that the secrecy of Board discussions 
prevents those outside government from 
discovering how the Directors who represent 
them have (notionally) voted on behalf 
of the populations of the countries they 
represent
• inadequacy of the human resources available 
to developing country Directors relative to 
their workloads
• the de facto appointment of the heads of the 
institutions by the US government (in the 
case of the World Bank) and the members 
of the European Union (in the case of the 
IMF).
The overwhelming dominance of high-income coun-
try governments in IMF and World Bank decision-
making – including over how changes to their gover-
nance systems, voting weights, and other procedural 
rules are made – also represents a fundamental obsta-
cle to reform.
These governance structures, characterized by what 
Chowla et al. (2007) describe as a “democratic defi-
cit”, inevitably shape the policy decisions taken by the 
IMF and World Bank, and thus the nature and em-
phasis of their activities (Pincus and Winters 2002). 
A number of the major activities of these institutions 
have been widely criticized as having had substantial 
adverse effects on health and its social determinants. 
These include their management of debt and financial 
crises over the past three decades, their promotion of 
 23  The scientific credibility of some of that knowledge, however, has been called into question in a recent independent evaluation of its research. Some of the most critical 
comments were applied to World Bank studies linking globalization/trade openness to growth and poverty reduction.
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“structural adjustment” policies (particularly in Sub-
Saharan Africa and Latin America), their role in the 
transition process in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 
and the nature of health policy reforms promoted by 
the World Bank. Given recognition of the important 
link between the governance of the World Bank and 
IMF, and the effectiveness of their policies, there is 
some evidence of efforts to make them more exter-
nally accountable through different ex post evaluation 
processes. However, to date accountability has been 
focused on northern NGOs and institutions, raising 
questions about their effectiveness if powerful north-
ern interests are directly affected. It is also important 
to acknowledge shifts in policy thinking within the 
World Bank under the leadership of James Wolfensohn 
(1995-2005) who gave greater emphasis to poverty 
reduction and equity (Wolfensohn 2005). It remains 
unclear whether this agenda will continue under the 
leadership of Robert Zoellick who replaced the briefly 
serving Paul Wolfowitz in 2007.25 Finally, there is some 
degree of plurality in the types of knowledge generated 
by the World Bank, although it is unclear how this is 
supported internally in terms of career mobility. The 
assessment by Banerjee et al. (2006) of World Bank 
analyses questions their quality, notably studies of glo-
balization, trade liberalization and growth, and their 
ideological rather than empirical focus.
The lesson learned from this case study is that the gov-
ernance of the World Bank and IMF falls far short of 
recognized principles of good governance. This feature 
continues to be heavily criticized by a wide range of 
stakeholders. This, combined with substantial evidence 
of the adverse impacts caused by the policies of these in-
stitutions on the poor and vulnerable within and across 
societies, suggests that fundamental changes to the gov-
ernance of the World Bank and IMF is needed to effec-
tively tackle the SDH. WHO could take a lead role in 
drawing attention to the links between the weak gover-
nance of these organizations, and their resultant adverse 
effects on the SDH.
2.3.2 Case study: The World Summit    
  on Social Development
Held in Copenhagen in 1995, the World Summit for 
Social Development was the largest ever gathering of 
world leaders at that time. It pledged to make the 
conquest of poverty, the goal of full employment and 
the fostering of social integration overriding objec-
tives of development. In June 2000 the meeting re-
convened (Copenhagen+5) to review what had been 
achieved, and to agree to new initiatives. These com-
mitments are all relevant to the SDH:
1. To eradicate absolute poverty by a target date 
to be set by each country
2. To support full employment as a basic policy 
goal
3. To promote social integration based on the 
enhancement and protection of all human 
rights
4. To achieve equality and equity between 
women and men
5. To accelerate the development of Africa and 
the least developed countries
6. To ensure that structural adjustment pro-
grammes include social development goals
7. To increase resources allocated to social 
development
8. To create economic, political, social, cultural 
and legal environment that will enable people 
to achieve social development
9. To attain universal and equitable access to 
education and primary health care and
10. To strengthen cooperation for social develop-
ment throughout the UN.
The key UN body in charge of follow-up and imple-
mentation of the Copenhagen Declaration and Pro-
gramme of Action is the UN Commission for Social 
Development, a functional commission of the Eco-
nomic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Comprised 
of 46 elected members, the Commission meets annu-
ally in New York to consider a key social development 
theme. In 2006 the Commission reviewed the first UN 
Decade for the Eradication of Poverty (1997-2006) 
(UN Department of Social Affairs n.d.).
In principle the Commission’s mandate means that it 
has the potential to affect many of the SDH. How-
ever, to achieve this requires stronger political support. 
NGOs expressed “profound disappointment” at the 
low priority given to Copenhagen+5 and “grave con-
cern” at the lack of will to carry its commitments for-
ward. Only 19 heads of state, mostly from Africa with 
only two from high-income countries (Denmark and 
Norway), attended the summit (Raghavan 2000a). 
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While the Commission’s report, A Better World For 
All, was a joint publication with the World Bank, 
IMF and OECD of Copenhagen+5, donors failed 
to empower the UN, and ECOSOC in particular, to 
take a lead role on social development. Thus, despite 
three summits and an agenda for social development, 
follow up support for implementation of its goals has 
shifted to the Millennium Development Goals. The 
continued low priority given to the role of ECOSOC 
may hinder effective efforts to address the SDH, un-
derscoring the importance of WHO taking the lead 
role in this area.
The lesson learned from this case study is that there has 
been broad-based global support for increased efforts to 
tackle the SDH, and the opportunity to effectively do so 
through recent initiatives such as the World Summit on 
Social Development. However, this requires donor gov-
ernments and key global institutions to strengthen finan-
cially and support the UN to follow up the commitments 
already made. 
2.3.3 Case study: Millennium Development Goals
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are a set 
of eight time-bound (to 2015) and measurable goals 
and targets for combating poverty, hunger, disease, il-
literacy, environmental degradation and discrimina-
tion against women. In September 2000 world leaders 
met to agree the UN Millennium Declaration (http://
www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.pdf ). 
This was followed by commitments of resources and 
actions based on the declaration at the International 
Conference on Financing for Development held in 
Monterrey, Mexico in 2002. The goals are intended 
to provide a framework for the entire UN system to 
work coherently towards a common end. As described 
by the UN, the MDGs are “a blueprint agreed to by 
all the world’s countries and all the world’s leading 
development institutions. They have galvanized un-
precedented efforts to meet the needs of the world’s 
poorest” (UN 2002).
The importance of the MDGs to global governance 
is that they represent framework for action by a wide 
range of international organizations, 190 governments 
and non-state actors. For example, the UN’s Millen-
nium Campaign (http://www.millenniumcampaign.
org) has brought together civil society groups, faith-
based organizations, trade unions and celebrities. The 
MDGs have also generated new funding and drawn 
renewed attention to key global health challenges 
(UN 2002).
However, the MDGs have not escaped criticism. 
With respect to global governance, the process 
by which they were adopted, the measure of their 
achievement, and their potential to skew develop-
ment policy have been questioned (Attaran 2005). 
It is argued that the MDGs themselves, based on a 
declaration as a broad statement of principles and 
values, are selective, focused inappropriately on mea-
surable targets, and defined within an arbitrary time-
frame. This resulted from the need to turn a broad 
philosophical statement into a list of actions that are 
politically short-sighted and financially attractive. 
However, the result is the prioritization of certain 
goals, and the omission of others, such as acknowl-
edgement of health as a human right, environmen-
tal protection and employment. For example, the 
MDG’s goal to halve poverty (measured as less than 
US$1 per day) by 2015 contrasts with rights-based 
arguments which call for an adequate standard of 
health by all (Reddy and Pogge 2005), and even with 
the World Summit on Social Development’s com-
mitment to fully eradicate absolute poverty by a set 
date. Moreover, the MDGs focus on selected social 
sectors, notably education and health, rather than on 
the broader structure of the global political economy 
which impact on the SDH.
Of particular note is the lack of emphasis on equi-
ty (other than gender) from the MDGs despite the 
Declaration’s references to social justice, principles of 
equality (rights and opportunities), and solidarity. The 
focus of the MDGs is on national aggregates, not on 
the equitable distribution of any gains achieved. Thus, 
one could halve poverty but still leave half a popula-
tion worse off. Moser et al. (2005, p. 1,182), in their 
study of 22 low- and lower-middle-income countries, 
find that: “National improvements in under 5 mor-
tality, in line with the millennium development goal, 
are as likely to be accompanied by increasing as de-
creasing inequalities in child mortality within coun-
tries; adding an equity dimension to this goal would 
give an impetus to adopting policies that tackle health 
inequalities”. Development experts further argue that 
growth in income of the poor in real terms without 
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consideration of the share of growth captured by the 
poorest population groups cannot be described as 
pro-poor; and that redistribution of wealth to address 
global inequalities within and across countries must 
also be addressed (ODI 2006).
Finally, there is criticism of how change is defined 
and measured by the MDGs. There is a focus on se-
lected technically defined targets and measurable in-
dicators that are narrow in scope and do not incorpo-
rate targets or indicators associated with changes in 
the SDH (Reddy and Pogge 2005; Reddy and Heuty 
2006). Consequently, the MDGs do not address the 
underlying and structural causes of the health prob-
lems and associated targets they identify. Further, At-
taran (2005) argues that several of the MDG targets 
are either practically or inherently not amenable to 
measurement, making progress impossible to deter-
mine.
The lesson learned from this case study is that the MDGs 
are a demonstration of significant commitment by the 
international community to strengthening development 
efforts, but are centred on outcomes (goals) rather than 
processes. The goals set miss addressing the SDH because 
of their lack of emphasis on underlying political and eco-
nomic causes of social stratification, risk, vulnerability 
and access that create inequities in health problems. These 
causes are partly recognized in the Millennium Declara-
tion’s reference to principles of social justice, equality and 
solidarity but these fundamental principles have not been 
followed through in the operationalization of these com-
mitments in the targets set by the MDGs.
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This section reviews the available evidence as-sessing the good governance of key global 
governance institutions concerned with the SDH. 
Given the limitations of the current evidentiary 
base, this analysis can only serve as an indicative, 
rather than a comprehensive, discussion. Nonethe-
less, it demonstrates the importance of strengthen-
ing global governance both as one important means 
of tackling the SDH, and with specific reference to 
incorporating SDH concerns within existing, new 
or reformed global institutions. 
3.2 Policy coherence and coordination
The problems of poor policy coherence and coor-
dination in global cooperation have been long and 
widely recognized (CIDA 2002; OECD 2003). 
As described global governance is characterized by 
a proliferation of institutional actors as a result of 
greater interconnectedness across issue areas, and the 
involvement of non-state actors. Internally many in-
stitutions face increased fragmentation as they seek 
to incorporate a broader range of issues within their 
mandates. Across institutions this has led to “man-
date creep” and potential overlap with other institu-
tions (Lee et al. 1996).
Efforts to increase coordination and coherence have 
been hindered, in the first instance, by a lack of, or 
inequities in, representation and accountability in 
many of the global institutions. It is further con-
strained by the absence of any overarching authority 
in global governance above sovereign states. Key insti-
tutional actors concerned with global governance op-
erate largely independently of one another, formally 
accountable to certain constituencies such as the most 
powerful member states, but not to a higher level of 
authority. Importantly the increased number of in-
stitutions, and scope of their work, reflect differences 
in perspectives as how best to tackle global issues. 
There are fundamental differences in goals, expertise, 
value bases, constituencies and resources among in-
stitutions. Moreover, these diverse institutions vary 
in the power and influence they exert. Dissatisfaction 
among some donor governments with certain institu-
tional mechanisms (including WHO’s) has led to the 
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creation of alternative institutions, adding further to 
the coordination challenge.
What priority is given to the SDH, and how policy 
problems and solutions are framed, is currently shaped 
by those institutions that hold power and influence. 
WHO currently is not one of them. For example, in 
analysing how equity and social inequalities can be ad-
dressed more effectively in a globalizing world, Dea-
con (2004) observes fragmentation and competition 
among the World Bank, WTO, the UN system, the 
G8 and other groupings of countries, and national so-
cial development initiatives. The current global archi-
tecture is, in short, a complex array of independent, 
unequal and even competing, institutions.
Within the health sector, the need for better coordina-
tion is recognized as a long-standing challenge. There 
is substantial evidence of the imperfections of the 
global governance architecture in the form of duplica-
tion of effort, overlapping mandates, gaps in effort, 
and undue transaction costs imposed on recipient 
countries (Lee et al. 1996; Buse and Walt 1997; Walt 
et al. 1999a; van Diesen and Walker 1999; Martinez 
2006). The WHO Constitution states that one of its 
functions is “to act as the directing and co-ordinating 
authority on international health work” (Paragraph 
2(a)). However, dissatisfaction by some donor gov-
ernments with certain WHO activities from the late 
1970s deemed “political”, notably “health for all”, es-
sential drugs and regulation of breastmilk substitutes, 
led to the creation of alternative mechanisms outside 
WHO. This included UNAIDS,25 the Global Alliance 
for Vaccines and Immunization (Muraskin 2002) and 
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
(Phillips 2002).
The perceived need for improved policy coherence has 
arisen more recently from efforts to address key health 
issues through action in cooperation with other sec-
tors. Globalization has blurred policy domains by cre-
ating greater linkages across issue areas, as well as levels 
of governance. According to the UK Department for 
International Development (UK DFID 2006), policy 
coherence “is achieved when policies across a range 
of issues (for example trade, migration, security) sup-
port, or at least do not undermine, the attainment of 
development objectives.” Similarly the OECD (2003, 
p. 2) defines policy coherence as “systematic promo-
tion of mutually reinforcing policy actions among 
government departments and agencies creating syner-
gies towards achieving the agreed objectives.” The lack 
of policy coherence, according to UK DFID (2006) 
weakens the efficiency and impact of aid. This occurs 
through:
• lost opportunities for complementarities when 
policies contradict each other
• too few mechanisms to systematically detect 
and resolve policy conflicts, and the difficulty 
of balancing legitimate domestic and global 
interests when such conflicts become apparent
• insufficient political pressure for change, both 
at the domestic level (with limited public 
awareness on the impact of different policies 
and trade-offs made by government) and 
internationally (with limited forums for low 
income countries to hold rich ones to account)
• complex decision-making systems where 
multiple domestic interests compete alongside 
multilateral agendas, special interest groups 
and developing partners.
There have been ongoing efforts since the early 1990s 
to improve coherence and coordination in health de-
velopment as part of a “new architecture of aid”. For 
example, within individual countries, the sector-wide 
approach (SWAp) has been adopted to bring togeth-
er institutions concerned with health development. 
SWAp is defined as:
a process in which funding for the sector – 
whether internal or from donors – supports 
a single policy and expenditure programme, 
under government leadership, and adopting 
common approaches across the sector.  It is 
generally accompanied by efforts to strengthen 
government procedures for disbursement and 
accountability. A SWAp should ideally involve 
broad stakeholder consultation in the design of a 
coherent sector programme at micro, meso and 
macro levels, and strong co-ordination among 
donors and between donors and government. 
(UK DFID 2001, p. 1)
 25  See Hanefield J., et al., op.cit.
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While focused on the health sector per se, and thus not 
an instrument for addressing the SDH, SWAp offers 
ideas for strengthening institutional links across mul-
tiple sectors. Other UN initiatives include the Com-
mon Country Assessment (CCA), UN Development 
Assistance Framework (UNDAF), and UN Resident 
Coordinators. Joint efforts by WHO and the ILO on 
ensuring decent working conditions in the Americas 
illustrates the potential for strategic and operational 
collaboration (ILO 2006).
Another approach is to strengthen coordination of 
institutions across a specific health issue. The Inte-
grated Management of Childhood Illness (IMCI) is 
an approach by WHO and UNICEF that focuses 
on promoting and protecting the well-being of the 
whole child. Children brought for medical treatment 
in the developing world often suffer from more than 
one condition, making a single diagnosis impossible. 
IMCI is an integrated strategy which takes account 
of the variety of factors that put children at serious 
risk. It ensures the combined treatment of the major 
childhood illnesses, emphasizing prevention of dis-
ease through immunization and improved nutrition 
(WHO 1999).  
In relation to the SDH, based on national-level ob-
servations, it is widely acknowledged that impacts 
on health and health determinants arise from poli-
cies dealing primarily with matters other than health 
(Ståhl et al. 2006). This is especially important in ar-
eas where health impacts have not traditionally been 
considered, such as economic, trade and industrial 
policies. Furthermore, by definition, efforts to ad-
dress the broad determinants of health including the 
SDH require engagement with non-health sectors. 
Greater engagement across global institutions work-
ing in different sectors is thus dependent on current 
efforts to redress the shortfalls in coordination and 
coherence. The most prominent of these initiatives is 
the MDGs. Similarly the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
(PRS) approach emphasizes cross-sectoral collabo-
ration to (a) identify effective strategies to reduce 
poverty; and (b) to modify external partnerships and 
assistance to reduce poverty more effectively (World 
Bank 2006). Who identifies effective strategies re-
mains a contentious issue.
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to review 
the range of measures adopted to improve coordina-
tion and coherence, a number of observations can be 
made about efforts to date:
• Although strong consensus exists for such 
improvements, the effectiveness of such 
efforts remains dependent on the degree 
to which powerful interests are willing to 
submit to coordination efforts. There has 
been a tendency for such interests to create 
new institutional mechanisms where they 
retain their dominance, rather than redistrib-
ute power among a wider range of stakehold-
ers within existing mechanisms. For example, 
the US government decision to establish 
PEPFAR rather than contribute to the Global 
Fund or UNAIDS has resulted in additional, 
even competing, institutional structures.26
• Health appears to be well recognized in 
broader development initiatives. However, 
policy coherence is hindered by the uneven 
level of development of global governance 
across different sectors. Economic globaliza-
tion has led to strengthened regulation of 
trade and finance given their importance to 
high-income countries and corporate inter-
ests. At the same time health-based normative 
and standard-setting work has not developed 
to the same degree and speed (Fidler 2005b).
• There is a clear tension between the need to 
accommodate diverse ideological perspectives 
on health development, through a plurality 
of institutions, and the optimal use of limited 
resources through coordinated action. How 
can the SDH be served best?
• There remains need at the global level for a 
central body to act as a key reference point, 
for example, to consolidate technical knowl-
edge, monitor global trends in health, and 
serve as a venue for policy debate, especially 
putting the SDH at centre stage. This pres-
ents an important and challenging opportu-
nity for WHO.
• Comparative assessment of the effectiveness of 
various initiatives to improve coordination and 
coherence remains needed. The proliferation 
 26  See Hanefield J., et al., op.cit.
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of new coordinating mechanisms, particu-
larly disease-focused initiatives, has outpaced 
critical evaluation of them.
• The nature of contemporary global governance 
relevant to the SDH cannot be described as 
a “system” per se. Rather it is a set of institu-
tions evolving from a base established in the 
1940s, through ad hoc changes determined by 
historical precedent, an ideological orientation 
and importantly the current and historical 
unequal distribution of power and resources. 
As a result, existing institutions are neither an 
expression of the collective will of the global 
community, nor a beneficiary-centred strategic 
approach to addressing common needs.
3.3 Transparency and accountability
Mechanisms of transparency and accountability in 
public policy are fundamental to the effective func-
tioning of democratic political systems. At the na-
tional level, such mechanisms include processes of 
appointing political representatives, provisions for ac-
cessing information, opportunities to influence policy 
discussions, and systems for challenging the actions 
of public authorities. At the global level, where con-
stituencies may be dispersed or unclear, and there is an 
absence of overarching and binding authority, effec-
tive mechanisms are a significant challenge are clearly 
not in place.
There has been increased attention to improving the 
transparency and accountability of global institutions 
in recent years. For example, the IFIs Transparency 
Resource has developed 250 indicators for assessing 
transparency from their perspective within the inter-
national financial institutions.27 Similarly the One 
World Trust (Blagescu et al. 2006) has developed a 
Global Accountability Index to individually assess 
“thirty of the world’s most powerful organisations 
from the corporate, inter-governmental, and non-gov-
ernmental sectors” including WHO, the World Bank, 
Nestlé, Pfizer and the International Federation of Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). It defines 
accountability as “the processes through which an or-
ganisation makes a commitment to respond to and 
balance the needs of stakeholders in its decision-mak-
ing processes and activities, and delivers against this 
commitment,” Four core accountability dimensions 
are identified as critical to managing accountability 
claims from both internal and external stakeholders: 
transparency, participation, evaluation and complaint 
and response mechanisms. The report concludes that 
global governance today is defined, not by unaccount-
able organizations, but by “organisations that are ei-
ther accountable to the wrong set of stakeholders, or 
focus their accountability on one set of stakeholders 
at the expense of others” (Blagescu et al. 2005). The 
critical challenge is achieving an appropriate balance 
among a diverse range of stakeholders, both internal 
(individuals or groups formally part of the organiza-
tion) and external (individuals or groups affected by an 
organization’s decisions). Notably the report’s findings 
are limited by assessing each organization individually, 
rather than comparatively, and according to criteria 
set by the organizations themselves rather than an ob-
jective set of standards for assessing performance.
Implicit or explicit assumptions of stakeholder ac-
countability underpin recent efforts to engage with in-
stitutional actors within the state, the market and civil 
society in policy making. The result has been a pro-
liferation of “partnerships” and global public policy 
networks (GPPNs) seen as a less formal participatory, 
yet more integrated, approach to global governance 
(Reinicke et al. 2000). In this context international 
organizations are cast in the role of convenors, plat-
forms, networkers and, at times, part financiers of GP-
PNs. A good example is the work of the Global Public 
Policy Institute (GPPI), a non-profit think tank based 
in Berlin, whose work seeks to strengthen “strategic 
communities around pressing policy challenges by 
bringing together the public sector, civil society and 
business.”28 In global health, examples include the 
Healthy Cities Networks, Global Network of People 
Living with HIV/AIDS, and Framework Convention 
Alliance.
Despite this apparent broadening of stakeholder in-
volvement, a more systematic and critical assessment 
of the representativeness, quality of transparency and 
accountability remains needed for most global insti-
tutions concerned with the SDH. The focus to date 
has largely been on improving financial and program 
 27  See http://www.ifitransparencyresource.org/en/index.aspx (accessed October 17, 2006).
 28  See www.gppi.net (accessed October 17, 2006).
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accountability, notably to major funders of global ini-
tiatives, rather than to a broad range of stakeholders, 
especially beneficiaries. The current global governance 
architecture related to the SDH lacks agreed defini-
tions and measures of transparency and accountabil-
ity. What processes should be transparent? For what 
should an organization be accountable and to whom? 
Should a regulatory global agency be accountable to 
global stakeholders that it aims to regulate? To whom 
and for what are global CSOs, networks and corpora-
tions accountable, apart from the national laws that 
might regulate them, or the interests of their own 
members?
Among health-focused organizations, the Global 
Fund, corporate associations (e.g. International Fed-
eration of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associa-
tions - IFPMA) and various global public-private part-
nerships remain largely outside wider public scrutiny. 
Large foundations such as the Gates Foundation op-
erate independently given their substantial resources. 
Large transnational NGOs are answerable to boards of 
directors and funders, rather than to the communities 
they serve. Even intergovernmental organizations, led 
by WHO, must reflect on who their stakeholders are 
(beyond member states) and how they should engage 
with them. Perhaps most importantly there are ques-
tions to be raised about the narrow range of stakehold-
ers served by key institutions such as the OECD and 
G8. Finally, in keeping with generally accepted prin-
ciples of democracy and/or of good governance, an 
overall system of “checks and balances” must evolve. 
Its purpose would be to ensure collective transparency 
and accountability across the diverse institutions as a 
key feature of any system of global governance.  
3.3.1 Case study: International Health Regulations
The International Health Regulations were established 
in the 19th century, known then as the International 
Sanitary Regulations, to govern sanitary conditions 
required by all forms of transport for preventing the 
spread of disease. The IHR agreement was ostensibly 
driven by the desire to facilitate growing trade rela-
tions (Fidler 2005a). Limited to a few selected diseases 
and functions, the IHR has been subject to periodic 
attempts at revision. Economic globalization, inten-
sifying trade and incorporating almost the entire the 
world trading system, led to a fundamental review in 
the late 1990s. This proved an initially protracted pro-
cess because of a lack of political will and resources 
to develop a new approach. The SARS outbreak and 
prospects of pandemic influenza, however, lent a 
greater sense of urgency to the process in high-income 
countries. The revised regulations were unanimously 
adopted on May 23, 2005 by the World Health As-
sembly, and are scheduled to come into force in June 
2007.29 The broadened purpose and scope of the IHR 
(2005) are to “prevent, protect against, control and 
provide a public health response to the international 
spread of disease and which avoid unnecessary inter-
ference with international traffic and trade”.
The provisions adopted within the IHR (2005) are a 
good example of enhanced transparency and account-
ability for the purposes of global disease surveillance 
and control. The revised mandate it gives to member 
states and WHO has expanded their respective roles 
and responsibilities. In particular states parties to the 
IHR (2005) are required to develop, strengthen and 
maintain core surveillance and response capacities to 
detect, assess, notify and report public health events 
to WHO and respond to public health risks and pub-
lic health emergencies. WHO, in turn, is to collabo-
rate with states parties to evaluate their public health 
capacities, facilitate technical cooperation, logistical 
support and the mobilization of financial resources 
for building capacity in surveillance and response. 
States Parties and WHO are now developing plans for 
implementing IHR (2005).
Perhaps the most significant achievement of the re-
vised IHR (2005) is its capacity to draw on a far wider 
range of information sources than member states. In 
the past a key limitation of surveillance, monitoring 
and reporting efforts was dependence on governmen-
tal sources of data which, if not forthcoming, could 
not be effectively challenged. The IHR (2005) states 
that, while national IHR Focal Points will liaise with 
WHO IHR Contact Points, WHO “may take into 
account reports from sources other than notifica-
tions or consultations and shall assess these reports 
 29  All Member States of WHO will become states parties to the IHR (2005) except for any that reject the Regulations before December 15, 2006. States not Members of 
 WHO may become states parties to the IHR (2005) by notifying the Director-General of WHO of their acceptance.
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according to established epidemiological principles 
and then communicate information on the event to 
the State Party in whose territory the event is allegedly 
occurring” (Article 9.1).
Given the origins of the IHR, there remain concerns 
about how the key term “public health emergency of 
international concern” will be interpreted in relation 
to the need to “avoid unnecessary interference with 
international traffic and trade.” Should a public health 
risk arise requiring measures to restrict trade, how will 
application of the IHR differ from, for example, mea-
sures under the WTO to protect public health (see 
Section 3.3.3)?  How will public health interests fare 
against trade interests should disagreement over “lev-
el of proof” of “scientific evidence” arise? The IHR 
(2005) remains unclear in this respect, leaving the 
protection of public health potentially secondary to 
powerful economic interests.
The lesson learned from this case study is that the key 
function of global disease surveillance, monitoring and 
reporting has been enhanced by increased transparency. 
This has taken the form of greater participation of non-
state actors in what was hitherto dependent on govern-
ment information sources. The increased availability of 
global information and communication systems provides 
an opportunity for improved information sharing, as 
well as the reduced capacity of governments to withhold 
important information from the global community. This 
reality has been institutionalized under the IHR, a func-
tion focused largely on disease control, yet raises impor-
tant implications for enhancing transparency to support 
the SDH.
3.3.2 Case study: The Group of Eight countries
While global governance is ostensibly concerned with 
the collective management of common affairs across 
the global community, it is important to recognize the 
major influence of the Group of Eight countries. The 
G8 is an informal forum for the world’s most eco-
nomically powerful countries, collectively represent-
ing around 65 per cent of the world’s GDP.30 Its pur-
pose is to provide a platform for bringing ministers 
of various portfolios together to discuss issues of mu-
tual concern. Given the economic power of member 
states, however, how such issues are addressed does 
have implications for the wider global community. 
Moreover, the agendas of G8 meetings have increas-
ingly addressed issues of global concern, such as infec-
tious diseases, climate change, security and debt. In 
doing so, there are concerns that the G8 is inappropri-
ately assuming a global governance role without, for 
example, sufficient accountability, transparency and 
representation.
In practice, the G8 is  distinctive in its lack of “the two 
main characteristics of more structured international 
governmental organizations (IGOs): a constitutive in-
tergovernmental agreement, and a secretariat” (Hajnal 
2005). Some view the G8 as a forum “where heads of 
state and government take cooperation further than 
their officials and ministers can” (Bayne 2001, p. 23). 
As the G8 Research Group claims, “Despite wide-
spread media scepticism…and continuing concerns 
about its legitimacy and representation, the G8 stands 
as the one system of international institutions provid-
ing effective political direction for our rapidly evolving 
world.”31 Others do not agree, arguing that the insti-
tution is important as a source of “group hegemony,” 
a construct “that explains how a few wealthy coun-
tries, namely the G7, maintain the liberal economic 
order, and how the rules governing this order help 
perpetuate the disparity between rich and poor coun-
tries” (Bailin 2005, p. viii). Understanding its role is 
essential to understanding global health disparities. A 
critical issue here is that many policy choices made by 
the G8 – for example, about development assistance 
and debt relief – have their major impacts outside the 
G8, in countries whose citizens are excluded from the 
G8’s deliberations.
The economic power of the G8 countries is formi-
dable. They “account for 48 per cent of the global 
economy and 49 per cent of global trade, hold four 
of the United Nations’ five permanent Security Coun-
cil seats, and boast majority shareholder control over 
 30  The G8 grew from an original Group of 6 that was formed in 1975 following the ‘oil crisis’ which demonstrated the risks arising from growing economic interconnectedness
 and the usefulness of political management of increased interdependence. The six founding countries (France, the US, UK, Germany, Italy and Japan) were joined in 1976 by 
Canada. In 1977 the European Community (now the European Union or EU) became a member but does not have the same status as national governments. Russia achieved 
partial membership in 1998 and full membership from 2003, completing today’s G8. 
 31 The G8 and Global Governance (http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/about/g8rg_g8gg.htm). (accessed August 23, 2006).
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the IMF and the World Bank” (Corlazzoli and Smith 
2005). They also account for roughly 75 per cent of 
the annual value of development assistance expendi-
ture, and their deep pockets are among the resourc-
es that provide them with formidable advantages in 
trade negotiations and dispute resolution proceedings, 
both within and outside the WTO (Jawara and Kwa 
2003).
The G8 have stated positions on health and global-
ization, although rarely making an explicit link be-
tween the two (Labonté et al. 2004). Commitments 
related to malnutrition, hunger and famine recurred 
from 1980 to 1987. HIV/AIDS was first referenced in 
1987. The early 1990s were dominated by commen-
taries on, or commitments to address, illegal drugs and 
biological weapons. There was passing reference to the 
need to curb health care costs arising, in part, to an 
aging population, framed as a net drain on economic 
growth. The first major statement on health by the 
G8 did not occur until 1996, from which point both 
HIV/AIDS and other acute and epidemic infections 
began to appear regularly in communiqués. With the 
exception of the 2004 Summit, health issues have be-
come increasingly prominent in G8 agendas (Kirton 
and Sunderland 2005).
The G8 stance on globalization is exemplified by its 
statement that “(d)rawing the poorest countries into 
the global economy is the surest way to address their 
fundamental aspirations” (Genoa Communiqué 
2001, p. 3). This formulation, critics argue, sidesteps 
the crucial issue of how and on whose terms such 
countries are to be integrated. The operative model 
for this integration has been variously described as the 
Washington Consensus and alternatively as neo-liber-
al economic globalization.32 More recently the G8 has 
been held up as a nimble grouping capable of exercis-
ing global governance for health (Kirton and Mannell 
2006).
In terms of accountability and transparency, the G8 is 
an exclusive club of the world’s richest and most pow-
erful countries. Can such a club play a representative 
lead role in global governance for the SDH? Sympa-
thetic observers note that G8 Summits can be assessed 
more positively on this question when the host coun-
try, or other prominent member, is preparing a legacy 
with less deference to domestic concerns. The role of 
US President Bill Clinton, in pushing forward the 
health agenda in Okinawa in 2000, Canadian Prime 
Minister Jean Chrétien’s role in giving Africa promi-
nence at Kananaskis in 2002, and UK Prime Minister 
Tony Blair’s (and would-be Prime Minister Brown’s) 
support for aid, trade and debt relief at Gleneagles in 
2005 are prime examples (Kirton and Mannell 2006). 
Schrecker et al. (in press), however, comment that 
“the fact that summit agendas are determined by the 
host country is not necessarily conducive to building 
momentum around complex issues that inherently re-
quire high levels of policy coordination, except in the 
case where a high degree of agreement already exists 
among G8 governments”. Early reports on the agenda 
for the Heiligendamm Summit of 2007 indicate that 
poverty and Africa will figure prominently. Whether 
this suggests that the SDH may become entrenched, 
at least indirectly, as ongoing points of G8 policy de-
liberation remains to be seen. Although national self-
interests are undoubtedly a key factor (bio-terrorism, 
infectious disease, pandemic influenza and other cross-
border health risks that figure prominently as health 
agenda items), the possibility of the G8 forming a nu-
cleus from which the SDH could be effectively tackled 
must be looked at with some scepticism.
Indeed any G8 claim to be a legitimate and effec-
tive force of global governance for health must be 
rejected until it addresses the question of account-
ability. Should it involve a larger global constituency 
of countries beyond the G8, where the impacts of 
many G8 policies are felt most directly? And should 
this larger constituency formally include civil society 
organizations? According to Hajnal (2005), the Bir-
mingham Summit (1998) “was a milestone in G8 in-
teraction with civil society” resulting from the active 
lobbying for debt cancellation by the Jubilee 2000 
coalition and formal acknowledgment of the move-
ment by Prime Minister Blair.  The Genoa Summit 
of 2001 saw broadened consultation with civil soci-
ety, with on-line discussions, and iterative summary 
and background documents managed by a university 
institute. While the violence that took place at the 
 32  See Schrecker T, Poon D. (2007), “Globalization, Labour Markets and the Social Determinants of Health,” Discussion Paper, Globalization Knowledge Network, WHO 
Commission on the Social Determinants of Health.
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summit reportedly dampened G8 leaders’ enthusiasm 
for such engagement (Kirton and Mannell 2006), the 
Montreal International Forum, an international NGO 
established in 1998 to increase civil society participa-
tion in global policy forums, convened small ‘high-
level’ invitational meetings between international 
NGOs and G8 representatives prior to the 2002 and 
2003 Summits.33 The Canadian (2002) and French 
(2003) governments also provided opportunities for 
consultation with their nationally based CSOs prior 
to their summits (Hajnal 2005). The 2004 summit 
hosted by the US gave no attention to civil society 
in consultations, briefings or reference in its delibera-
tions. In contract, the 2005 Summit was preceded by 
a solicitation of CSO inputs that was broader, deep-
er and more transparent than even many critics of 
G8 summitry had anticipated. The Live 8 and Make 
Poverty History campaigns (part of the larger Global 
Campaign Against Poverty) also played a role in sup-
porting and sustaining Tony Blair’s agenda ambitions 
for the Gleneagles Summit. In 2006, although CSO 
engagement in St. Petersburg was less visible to the 
western media, the summit saw the creation of a new 
organization (Civil G8) which hosted a website,34 
convened two international NGO forums in the run-
up to the summit, and provided an invitational pri-
vate meeting between President Vladimir Putin and 
12 international NGOs (Naidoo 2006).
There has been no formal study so far of the extent to 
which civil society participation affects G8 agendas 
and outcomes. Smaller NGOs view the more formal 
participation of ”top” NGOs in high-level meetings 
as a form of cooptation that lends legitimacy to the 
G8’s claim to global governance which, in their view, 
should remain with the UN (Hajnal 2005). These 
smaller NGOs have also complained that ”coziness” 
with G8 leaders led to a dilution of criticism and de-
mands made by several NGOs in the run-up to the 
Gleneagles Summit (Baruchel and Dasilva 2005). 
These reflect long-standing issues of accountability 
within, and differences in political strategies among, 
CSOs themselves. At least in a formal sense, the G8 
(with the exception of the 2004 Summit) has in-
creased its engagement with civil society which, in 
turn, has increased its role around G8 events, even if 
civil society influence on the final Summit outcomes 
remains somewhat dubious. The crucial normative is-
sue remains whether the G8 should view themselves as 
accountable to civil society constituencies. Nonethe-
less, momentum for greater civil society engagement 
is building, reflecting recognition “by everyone, in-
cluding governments of G8 countries, that civil soci-
ety is an increasingly important and powerful actor…
[that] gives voice to those who have been marginal-
ized or left behind by globalization, as it fights for the 
universal extension of the benefits of globalization” 
(Hajnal 2005). Designing mechanisms for civil soci-
ety engagement is therefore a particularly important 
task, keeping in mind the many ways in which access 
to key social determinants of health is affected by the 
processes of globalization.  
Similar conclusions can be drawn regarding G8 ef-
forts to include a broader range of global institu-
tions and world leaders. Heads of the UN, World 
Bank and IMF are frequently invited to summits – 
although their roles and who they represent is not 
clear – with the latter two usually attending G7 Fi-
nance Ministers’ meetings. However, this openness is 
only selectively extended to other UN organizations, 
such as UNDP or WHO. For example, the heads of 
the International Energy Agency (IEA) and WTO 
participated in 2005 Summit discussions of climate 
change and the global economy, and the head of the 
African Union Commission joined the 2005 discus-
sions of African development. Four African leaders 
(from South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal and Algeria) 
participated in the 2002 Summit, where their New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) was 
discussed and responded to by the G8 in the form 
of the latter’s Africa Plan of Action. The same four 
leaders also briefly joined the 2004 Summit and at-
tended the 2005 Summit where their issues figured 
even more prominently than in 2002. Africa disap-
peared from the 2006 Summit agenda, although the 
attendance of Ghanaian President John Agyekum 
Kufuor at the 2007 suggests renewed attention to 
the continent. Other country leaders have also been 
invited to G8 Summits, varying by summit agendas. 
The unusual inclusion of several Middle East leaders 
at the 2004 Summit, for example, was in deference 
to that region being one of that summit’s major fo-
cuses.  
 33  See http://www.fimcivilsociety.org/english/CivilSocietyG8.html (accessed August 28, 2006).
 34  See http://en.civilg8.ru/index.php.
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G8, even while seeking to participate in G8 deliberations 
and decisions related to the SDH.
3.3.3 Case study: World Trade Organization
The work of the WTO is defined primarily by the mul-
tilateral trade agreements (MTAs) under its auspices. 
Trade agreements are important to governance because 
they set the legal framework for member states to par-
ticipate in the world trading system. The WTO also 
offers a binding dispute settlement mechanism that 
interprets and upholds the provisions provided un-
der MTAs. The implications of MTAs for the SDH 
are addressed by a separate paper of the Globalization 
Knowledge Network.35 Capacities to maintain national 
policy space for development and regulatory action are 
also dealt with in a separate paper.36 Here we specifi-
cally focus on the impact of trade agreements on health 
governance at the national and global levels in relation 
to accountability and transparency of policies set. 
In terms of the formal structure, the WTO is relative-
ly democratic compared to other organizations such 
as the World Bank or IMF (Kovach et al. 2003). In 
principle the WTO is based on the one-state, one-vote 
decision making system. In practice, however, most 
substantive discussion takes place outside formal struc-
tures, through a complex series of meetings, such as 
“mini-ministerials”, “green room” meetings and “con-
fessionals”. With the complexity of negotiations across 
multiple areas and wide disparities in the financial and 
human resources available to developed and develop-
ing countries, this results in inequities in bargaining 
power. Thus, outcomes conform closely to the inter-
ests of developed countries or in stalemate. This is even 
more apparent in bilateral trade negotiations, outside 
the WTO, which can involve negotiations between 
even more unequal parties. This is reflected in growing 
concerns over so-called “WTO plus” commitments.
In terms of transparency and accountability, Blagescu 
and Lloyd (2006) find that relative to other intergov-
ernmental organizations surveyed, both the WTO and 
WHO score low against its Global Accountability In-
dex. However, it is important to note that this index 
Interestingly a new G8+5 group is emerging that in-
cludes leaders from China, India, Brazil, Mexico and 
South Africa. These five countries were invited to the 
2006 Summit, and were among the 15 invited to the 
2003 Summit. Reasons offered for their increased par-
ticipation include their growing economic clout, and 
their importance with respect to global energy gover-
nance and infectious disease control (Kirton and Sun-
derland 2006). On the one hand, institutionalizing a 
larger “club” membership might detract from the puta-
tive effectiveness and efficiency of the informal G8. On 
the other, it may be the seed of a more globally inclu-
sive G20, in terms of population, economy and health 
needs, or a new Group of 20 Leaders (L20), parallel to 
the G8. A prototype of sorts is provided by the Group 
of 20 (G20) Finance Ministers, which began meeting 
in 1999. The G20 consists of the G8 plus Argentina, 
Australia, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Mex-
ico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey. Canada 
convened and chaired the first two forums and former 
Canadian prime minister Paul Martin was a strong sup-
porter of this proposal. Some see this as a desirable im-
provement to present G8 claims to global governance 
(Kirton 2004; Bradford 2005). But an expanded club 
also poses substantially greater governance risks to the 
numerous smaller, economically weaker countries that 
remain excluded and the dominant role the US would 
continue to exert in a G/L20 grouping (Carin and 
Smith 2005; Higgott 2005). There is also concern that 
such a grouping would further erode the ability of UN 
agencies with fewer vested interests to act with author-
ity in health and the SDH.
The lesson learned from this case study is that the highly 
exclusive membership of the G8 is a product of the lack 
of accountability characterizing global governance in the 
early 21st century. Its members exert disproportionate 
power and influence over the world economy including 
policies impacting on people in low and middle-income 
countries. Leaders of the developing world are invited as 
occasional participants, rather than fully fledged mem-
bers, and remain limited in their capacity to influence 
key decision-making affecting the SDH. Like the World 
Bank and IMF, WHO could play a more active role in 
drawing attention to the governance shortcomings of the 
35 See Blouin C. et al., op.cit. for arguments and supporting evidence for/against the relationship between trade liberalization, growth, poverty reduction and health improvement. 
See also Cornia A. et al. (2007) “Globalisation and health: impact pathways and recent evidence,” Discussion Paper, Globalization Knowledge Network, WHO Commission 
on the Social Determinants of Health.
 36  See Koivusalo and Schrecker, op.cit.
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is based on particular views of good governance. For 
instance, it does not address to whom and how ac-
countabilities are realized, an issue when TNCs and 
NGOs are dealt with. There also remain substantial 
concerns about accountability in the context of in-
tergovernmental negotiations. Woods and Narlikar 
(2001) write that decisions made on the basis of 
consensus may compromise the more representative 
structure of the WHO (based on one country, one 
vote). In practice, however, power is asymmetrical 
among member states and thus not shared equally. 
This imbalance is even more striking within global 
economic institutions which do not even boast rep-
resentative or accountable decision making mecha-
nisms. Jawara and Kwa (2003) raise concerns about 
the process of negotiation based on interviews with 
WTO negotiators. They observe that closed negotia-
tions, such as those in WTO ministerials, rather than 
open access, are the preferred mode, with decisions 
often made without full approval by low- and mid-
dle-income countries. They also document instances 
of questionable pressures exerted, and inducements 
offered, by the US and EU delegations, including the 
use of aid as a bargaining chip. The highly technical 
nature of many discussions further contributes to the 
lack of transparency of procedures (Narlikar 2001; 
South Centre 2003).
The WTO and national policy space
WTO agreements explicitly recognize the right of gov-
ernments to regulate at the national level. However, as 
member states, this right must be exercised within the 
framework of WTO commitments. In the context of 
agreements, such as the GATT and TRIPS, national 
policy making must comply with all measures. For 
other agreements, such as the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS), governments retain sub-
stantial choice over what sector or mode of services 
to subject to its provisions. Broadly speaking, trade 
negotiations and mechanisms can limit or influence 
the choices available to national policy makers. Gov-
ernments may be obliged to follow agreed trade rules 
related to goods, services and intellectual property 
rights, thus influencing the extent to which a govern-
ment can regulate them. The protection of intellectual 
property rights under TRIPS, for example, can restrict 
the capacity of governments to regulate the price of 
pharmaceuticals.37
The scope available for governments to regulate is 
especially important in relation to the services sec-
tor given that WTO negotiations extend further 
into the realm of national policy making than the 
GATT (Fidler 2005b). This applies, not only to the 
health sector, but also to other health-related ser-
vices of which governments may seek to restrict free 
movement, such as alcohol distribution or advertis-
ing services (Grieshaber-Otto and Schacter 2001). It 
is also likely that trade-related regulatory frameworks 
on goods and services will be extended to state subsi-
dies and government procurement, already part of a 
plurilateral38 agreement. The start of negotiations on 
government procurement of services has been written 
into the original GATS agreement. The extension of 
MTAs to these areas may restrict the capacity of gov-
ernments to adopt national policies that seek to re-
duce, for example, geographical inequalities or address 
local production and employment problems.
Trade agreements do not only liberalize the trade 
of goods and services, but also strengthen intellec-
tual property rights. Particular attention needs to 
be drawn to the financial implications of protecting 
IPRs in terms of higher costs of new pharmaceuticals. 
This issue continues to be widely debated in relation 
to HIV/AIDS and access to affordable antiretrovirals, 
but it is a broader problem in the context of access 
to health care and technologies. Bilateral trade agree-
ments have also become the subject of intense debate 
due to some requiring stronger IPR protection than 
TRIPS. For example, in the case of the US-Korea Free 
Trade Agreement negotiations, pharmaceutical poli-
cies and pricing have been a key area of negotiation 
(Cutler 2006; Nam 2006; Vershbow 2006). Industrial 
and trade policy prioritizes the protection of IPRs, 
thus restricting the scope by which national govern-
ments can regulate the cost of patented pharmaceuti-
cals and technologies, or gain access to or share knowl-
edge related to health and health-related products.
 37  See Correa C (2007) “Intellectual Property Rights and Inequalities in Health Outcomes,” Discussion Paper, Globalization Knowledge Network, WHO Commission on 
 the Social Determinants of Health.
 38  A plurilateral agreement of the WTO is one signed only by those member states that wish to do so, in contrast with multilateral agreements to which all member states 
 are party.
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Global governance of health and trade
The relative roles of the UN and its specialized agen-
cies on the one hand, and the WTO on the other, 
are complicated by the fact that the WTO is empow-
ered with a binding process of dispute settlement that 
strengthens implementation of its measures. While 
inequitable, in terms of the potential impact of trade 
sanctions on bigger versus smaller economies, this 
process has been considered by some to be a potential 
governance vehicle for promoting the SDH. Specifi-
cally, some NGOs have campaigned for the incorpo-
ration of substantive health, labour and environmental 
issues (so-called social clauses) into WTO agreements. 
Although perhaps intuitively appealing, others argue 
that this is problematic for several reasons. Many de-
veloping countries see such clauses as primarily anoth-
er means of protectionism by high-income countries 
through the “back door”. Labour issues have received 
particular attention, eliciting contrasting views from 
NGOs and trade unions in low-income countries 
(O’Brien 2000). With respect to such clauses, there is 
concern over the lack of social policy expertise within 
the WTO. This may enhance trade-related perspec-
tives of such issues, at the expense of measures taken 
by social policy institutions that can deal with regu-
latory issues more comprehensively and not merely 
with respect to trade policy. A stronger social policy 
role for the WTO could also hamper effective dealing 
of trade issues with questions that trade officials are 
neither appropriate nor equipped to answer. At the 
same time, they could undermine the roles of existing 
institutions, such as the ILO, WHO, UNESCO and 
FAO.
WHO and FAO have engaged with the WTO since its 
inception in 1995, largely through the Codex Alimen-
tarius and SPS Agreement. In relation to labour stan-
dards, the ILO remains more distant. While the WTO 
might formally recognize existing international norms 
and agreements, it does not necessarily recognize UN 
agencies for global standard setting. Indeed, the WTO 
has delegated standard setting to such organizations 
as the International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO) which describes itself as occupying “a special 
position between the public and private sectors” (ISO 
2006).39 An issue of concern is the extent to which the 
ISO — as a network of national standards institutes 
in 157 countries — might expand its role in terms of 
technical standards for health and health-related ser-
vices. To what extent should health or public interest-
related tasks be given to an organization where private 
sector interests are strongly represented? Particular at-
tention has been drawn to problems arising from ISO 
standard setting for tobacco products (Yach and Agu-
inaga Bialous 2001; Han 2001).
The setting of norms and standards by different global 
institutions is not a problem when their decisions do 
not conflict. Moreover, Lamy (2006a) notes that the 
jurisdiction of the WTO does not supersede that of 
other international law:
The WTO, its treaty provisions and their 
interpretation, confirms the absence of any 
hierarchy between the WTO norms and those 
norms developed in other fora: WTO norms 
do not supersede or trump other international 
norms.
However, when priorities and aims differ, efforts to 
achieve greater coherence can lead to the framing of 
health-related issues within trade and other economic 
priorities. Thus, ministries of health may be required 
to coordinate with more politically powerful minis-
tries of trade and industry on IPRs and export promo-
tion to improve coherence. Although this may lead 
to greater accommodation of health or development 
concerns in economic policies, it is more likely that 
health policies are adjusted to be complementary to, 
or supportive of, economic objectives. For example, at 
the national level this could mean that, while poverty 
reduction measures could deal with the SDH outside 
the macroeconomic framework, such measures would 
need to be coherent with that framework. At the 
global level, WHO may be invited to address access to 
medicines and other trade-related matters, but only as 
long as actions are coherent with the aims and policies 
of the WIPO and WTO.
These concerns are evident in the WHA resolution on 
trade and health which emphasizes coherence between 
 39  Member institutions of the ISO vary in their affiliation. As stated on the ISO website, “many of its member institutes are part of the governmental structure of their countries, 
or are mandated by their government. On the other hand, other members have their roots uniquely in the private sector, having been set up by national partnerships of industry 
associations.”
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health and trade policies (WHO 2006). On what ba-
sis and under which framework is coherence sought? 
This is reflected in the dilution of the resolution to 
emphasize the need to assess the benefits and chal-
lenges (but not risks) of trade agreements to health. 
One issue for global governance, therefore, is how to 
assess the implications of trade agreements without 
being undermined by adverse impacts on vested trade 
interests. It is important that WHO not be reduced 
to a secondary helper of global trade policies, but that 
it has the resources, knowledge and independence to 
help governments promote and protect health from 
potentially adverse trade measures.
In trade policy essential decisions are made by senior 
trade officials as part of the dispute settlement pro-
cess. WHO has observer status on the Committee on 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures and the 
Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), but 
only ad hoc observer role in the committees dealing 
with IPRs and services. It has no status on the General 
Council, Committee on Government Procurement, 
or working parties on GATS rules, domestic regula-
tion, and transparency in government procurement, 
in spite of the potential importance of negotiations in 
these areas to national health systems. The problems 
of presence and substantive expertise were highlighted 
by the post-Doha and TRIPS Council negotiations. 
According to Raghavan (2000b), while economic dip-
lomats discussed which diseases in which developed 
countries constituted a public health problem, the 
representative of WHO was not permitted to offer ad-
vice or even to attend the meetings.
Particular attention has been drawn to NGO criti-
cism of the WTO. However, business-oriented 
NGOs have long been more closely engaged with 
WTO negotiations and trade treaty drafting than 
public interest NGOs. At the Singapore Ministerial 
(1996), for example, 65 per cent of official NGOs 
present were business organizations (Scholte et al. 
1998). This influence extends to the dispute settle-
ment processes. While governments nominally con-
trol access to these legal processes, in practice large 
corporate interests are often closely involved in the 
initiation and conduct of litigation by their govern-
ments (Keohane 2001). The active involvement of 
international NGOs and corporate lobbying was 
especially important in the development of interna-
tional legal frameworks and actions on IPRs and the 
TRIPS agreement (Braithwaithe and Drahos 2005; 
Drahos 1995). However, simply increasing broader 
and more representative CSO participation in or 
around the WTO may not resolve this imbalance. 
This is because such groups are likely to seek limits 
on commercial interests in ways that run counter to 
the WTO’s very raison d’être to increase the flow of 
goods and services across borders.
Rather, global and national level decisions on necessary 
public health measures or standards setting should be 
made on the basis of health concerns and health pol-
icy priorities separate from trade considerations. De-
cisions on health policies in the context of trade dis-
putes should be made on the basis of knowledge about 
health policies (including their impacts on the SDH), 
and not by senior trade policy officials whose terms 
of reference remains one of enhancing global trade. 
One of the ideas vetted by the World Commission on 
the Social Dimensions of Globalization, for example, 
was to refer disputes based on developing countries’ 
development goals to a panel of development/health/
human rights experts to determine if the abrogation 
of trade treaty rules was necessary to achieve the stated 
purpose. These could be extended to incorporate their 
actions to reach the MDGs or to fulfil their obliga-
tions under the right to health.
There are four lessons learned from this case study. First, 
if governance at the WTO is to take greater account of 
health (and notably the SDH), it is essential that the 
goals and norms existing UN agreements, human rights 
treaty commitments and the work of specialized agen-
cies, notably WHO, are recognised in trade policies.  The 
impacts of trade policies extend to all sectors, and these 
sectors need to be given due consideration.  In terms of 
global governance, this might mean cross-referencing of 
WTO agreements with those agreed in other spheres; for-
mal participation of other UN bodies in relevant WTO 
committees; and a role by non-trade organizations in the 
dispute settlement process on issues relevant to their ar-
eas of expertise. For WHO, this would mean a require-
ment by the WTO to call on its expertise when assessing 
a health-related issue or resolving a dispute. This means a 
much stronger role for WHO in trade issues, boosting its 
capacity to offer health-oriented advice to governments, 
and strengthening its ability to inform all SDH-related 
discussions at the WTO.
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Second, there is a need for substantive debate about the 
transparency and accountability of trade negotiations and 
policy making within the WTO. This requires strength-
ening accountability, from the national to global levels, of 
trade policies for their social and environmental impacts. 
In relation to the SDH, the relevance and influence of 
specific trade policies are unclear when negotiations take 
place.  
Third, the current standard-setting mechanisms for trade 
policies need to ensure that regulatory needs to protect and 
promote health (including the SDH) are not undermined 
or misused by powerful corporate actors. The governance of 
the ISO needs to be critically assessed to ensure that its role 
does not extend inappropriately, interfering for example 
with WHO’s mandate or into areas with significant health 
relevance such as biologicals. Similar attention should be 
given to WHO’s work with the Codex Alimentarius.
Fourth, it should be recognised that economic globaliza-
tion will benefit in the longer term from policy decisions 
giving due attention to health considerations. Taking ac-
count of the SDH does not compromise trade interests, 
but rather improves the sustainability of trade policies.
3.4 Participation and representation
In broad terms there has been an increased num-
ber of institutional actors in global health since the 
1990s, spanning state, market and civil society. It is 
often assumed that this more crowded institutional 
environment reflects greater pluralism. With the in-
crease in the number of institutional actors and the 
greater prominence of non-state actors and hybrid 
arrangements, the nature of the new political plural-
ism in global health must be critically assessed. What 
is the quality of representation within global institu-
tions that influence the SDH? Who are the different 
stakeholders involved in specific issues? How are they 
represented within the relevant institutions? To what 
extent can we link a focus on the SDH with quality of 
representation in institutions of global governance? Is 
there a new global health elite emerging that enhanc-
es, rather than reduces, health inequalities? Our re-
view suggests that considerable progress remains to be 
made in achieving democratic representation in global 
governance institutions concerned with the SDH.  
The greater participation of non-state actors in global 
governance is largely seen as positive for representa-
tion. However, non-state actors often comprise com-
mercial entities seeking to further their economic 
interests. For example, industry participation in the 
Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC) has raised 
concerns about the protection of consumer interests 
(see 3.4.3). So-called “astro-turf ” (false grassroots) 
organizations have increased to lobby for certain in-
terest groups and are even sponsored by other orga-
nizations (e.g. patient groups funded by industry).  
Financial ties and affiliations may not be declared, 
raising concerns regarding conflicts of interest and 
even covert intent.  The funding of front groups by 
the tobacco industry, with the intent of undermin-
ing tobacco control efforts, is well documented.  The 
International Tobacco Growers’ Association (ITGA), 
for example, describes itself as “a non-profit organisa-
tion founded in 1984 with the objective of present-
ing the cause of millions of tobacco farmers to the 
world.”40  Analysis of internal industry documents 
shows, however, that the ITGA in reality is “a public 
relations vehicle created in the 1980s by the tobacco 
industry to front its lobbying against international 
tobacco control initiatives by giving the industry 
a human face and a Third World grassroots voice” 
(Must 2001, p. 2).
3.4.1 Case study:  Global Fund to Fight HIV   
  AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria (GFATM) is a non-profit foundation estab-
lished in 2001 to support global efforts to fight HIV/
AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria.  The Fund was cre-
ated in response to consensus among high-income 
countries, notably at the G8 Summit of 2000, and 
to campaigning by NGOs for increased access to an-
ti-retroviral treatments. The purpose of the Fund is 
to attract, manage and disburse additional resources 
that will make a sustainable and significant contribu-
tion to the reduction of infections, illness and death 
(Global Fund 2006). To achieve this, it was recog-
nised that innovative forms of global governance 
were needed that would bring together diverse stake-
holders across the public and private sectors (Ollila 
2003).
 40    International Tobacco Growers Association. Who we are and what we do. http://www.tobaccoleaf.org/ (accessed October 17, 2006).
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The Fund is comprised of four governing, administra-
tive and advisory bodies.  The Foundation Board is the 
supreme governing body with responsibility for setting 
policies and strategies, making funding decisions, and 
“all other powers to carry out the purposes of the Fund.”  
The Board consists of twenty voting members as follows:  
seven developing countries; eight donor countries; and 
five representatives from civil society and the private sec-
tor consisting of an NGO from a high-income country, 
one NGO from a developing country, one private foun-
dation, one representative from the corporate sector, 
and one representative of an NGO who is a person liv-
ing with HIV/AIDS or from a community living with 
TB or malaria. The four ex-officio non-voting members 
are one representative each from WHO, UNAIDS, the 
trustee (the World Bank manages the fund as a trust-
ee), and one Swiss citizen. The process of selecting each 
Board member is left to each group represented, and 
the Board Member must serve as representatives of their 
constituencies for a two-year period.
The Technical Review Panel is described as “an indepen-
dent, impartial team of experts appointed by the Foun-
dation Board to guarantee the integrity and consistency 
of an open and transparent proposal review process” 
(Global Fund 2006, p. 8).  The 17-member panel re-
views applications and makes recommendations to the 
Board. The Partnership Forum is convened at least once 
every two years to provide persons and entities con-
cerned with the three diseases “a forum to express their 
views on the Foundation’s policies and strategies” (Glob-
al Fund 2006, p. 3).  Participation is ostensibly open to 
a wide range of stakeholders including donors, multi-
lateral development cooperation agencies, civil society, 
technical and research institutions and the private sec-
tor.  The Forum reviews progress based on reports from 
the Foundation Board, provides a platform for debate, 
advocacy and fundraising, mobilizes political support, 
and provides a communication channel. The Fund’s 
day-to-day work is carried out by a Secretariat housed 
by WHO in Geneva. The Secretariat is headed by an 
Executive Director, shortlisted by a Nomination Com-
mittee and selected by the Board “based on merit, in a 
non-political, open and competitive manner” (Global 
Fund 2006). The Executive Director serves as the chief 
executive officer for a term of four years, renewable for 
not more than one additional term of three years.
In many ways, the governance of the Fund has been 
innovative in its efforts to broaden and achieve an ap-
propriate balance of representation. The provision of 
voting rights to non-state actors (i.e. NGOs and pri-
vate companies) on the Board is unprecedented in such 
initiatives. Decisions made in Board meetings, agendas 
and attendees lists are made publicly available through 
the Fund’s website. The creation of the Partnership Fo-
rum as a platform for an even broader range of stake-
holders seeking to influence the activities of the Fund is 
also unusual. Overall, the Fund emphasises support for 
programmes that reflect national ownership and cor-
respondence with country-led policy formulation and 
implementation, rather than a prescribed strategy in-
tended for all recipient countries. 
Nonetheless, these innovations must be appraised in 
terms of their success at achieving meaningful and ap-
propriate representation.  First, there are ongoing de-
bates concerning the appropriate balance in number of 
representatives for each constituency.  Should NGOs, 
for example, be provided with more than two seats on 
the Board?  Second, to what extent are the decision-
making processes used by various constituencies, in se-
lecting their representatives, democratic?  How does the 
NGO community, for instance, select its two represen-
tatives given thousands of diverse organisations?  How 
representative can selected members be of their con-
stituencies?  Third, the relegation of WHO, UNAIDS 
and other UN bodies to non-voting members of the 
Foundation Board, while representatives of NGOs, pri-
vate companies and foundations are given voting rights, 
has been called into question.  The former are account-
able to member states of the UN system while it is un-
clear to whom the latter are accountable.  Finally, there 
remains debate about whether certain issues should 
receive greater attention.  In relation to the SDH, the 
Fund’s relatively narrow and vertical focus on three dis-
eases raises questions about its impact on health systems 
strengthening.  Indeed, while the Fund’s terms of refer-
ence are seen to provide focus and help in mobilizing 
funds, this is recognised as potentially creating difficul-
ties of integration with existing national health systems, 
as well as detracting from non-focal diseases and health 
programmes. In addition, Hanefield et al.41 have found 
that there are few programs that address the underlying 
factors contributing to women’s vulnerability to HIV 
 41  See Hanefield et al. (2007), op.cit.
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infection, such as a lack of programs tackling gender 
relations and gender violence, although the Fund has 
created some environments that appear relatively in-
clusive, namely the country coordinating mechanisms. 
From the fifth round of requests for proposals from 
countries, health systems strengthening are included as 
an explicit category of activity.
The lesson learned from this case study is that, while tack-
ling the SDH requires the meaningful involvement of a 
broad range of stakeholders in relevant decision-making 
bodies, clear criteria should exist on how different inter-
ests will be represented, the accountability of stakeholder 
organizations to their own constituencies, and selection 
processes for stakeholder groups.  Global institutions must 
democratize their formal decision making to accommo-
date broader participation. Current forms of informal 
and ad hoc participation are largely insufficient, and 
there is a need to create new political spaces where global 
constituencies, which include state, market and civil soci-
ety actors, can contribute.  At the same time, the involve-
ment of broader constituencies must go hand in hand 
with an appropriate mandate to tackle the SDH. 
3.4.2 Case study: Codex Alimentarius Commission
The Codex Alimentarius was created in 1963 by the 
FAO and WHO to be “the single most important in-
ternational reference point for developments associ-
ated with food standards” (FAO/WHO 2005, p. 1-2). 
Commission has 172 member states, and the WTO 
uses it as an international reference point for the res-
olution of disputes concerning food safety and con-
sumer protection. During its existence, it has adopted 
around 250 standards which together comprise the 
Codex Alimentarius (Food Code).
Codex meets annually (alternately in Rome and Ge-
neva) with plenary sessions attended by up to 500 
country representatives. National delegations are led 
by senior officials appointed by member states. Del-
egations may, and often do, include representatives 
of industry, consumer organizations and academic 
institutes. Countries that are not yet members of the 
Commission sometimes attend in an observer capac-
ity. A number of international governmental orga-
nizations and international NGOs also attend in an 
observer capacity. Although they are “observers”, the 
tradition of the Codex Alimentarius Commission al-
lows such organizations to put forward their points of 
view at every stage except in the final decision, which 
is the exclusive prerogative of member states. To facili-
tate continuous contact with member countries, the 
Commission, in collaboration with national govern-
ments, has established country Codex Contact Points 
and many member countries have National Codex 
Committees to coordinate activities nationally.
Criticism has been raised about the extent to which 
the food industry is represented within the Commis-
sion, and thus the balance achieved between the goals 
of trade and consumer protection. According to the re-
port Cracking the Codex (Avery et al. 1993), 81 per 
cent of non-governmental participants on national 
delegations came from industry between 1989 and 
1991, while only 1 per cent represented public interest 
groups. The study examined participation on all Codex 
committees that met between 1989 and 1991, find-
ing that industry representatives accounted for 26 per 
cent of all participants. Industry participation increased 
on committees dealing with particularly controversial 
issues. For example, one-third of the 387 participants 
in the two meetings of the Committee on Pesticide 
Residues were industry representatives, and 86 of these 
participants represented specific agrochemical and food 
companies; only three participants at these meetings 
represented public interest groups. Forty-one per cent 
of the participants in the two meetings of the Codex 
Committee on Food Additives and Contaminants were 
food industry representatives. On the Codex Commit-
tee for Nutrition and Special Dietary Uses, 47 per cent 
of participants represented industry.
This imbalance in the representation has led to low-
er food standards which favour trade over consumer 
protection. Many Codex standards are lower than na-
tional ones, allowing, for example, residues of some of 
the most hazardous pesticides in the world. Residues 
of these pesticides are banned or strictly limited in 
many countries of the world. Lang writes, “With an 
increased role for Codex, nations will effectively hand 
a great deal of control over the regulation of food safe-
ty and quality to global trade and corporate interests” 
(as quoted in Avery et al.1995).
For the Codex Alimentarius Commission to be a 
global governance mechanism that more effectively 
protects and promotes the SDH, an improved system 
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of representation and participation by a broader range 
of stakeholders, notably groups representing consumer 
interests, is needed. This is especially relevant given the 
enhanced role of Codex in trade liberalization, and 
growing evidence of the links between weak global food 
regulation and nutrition-related health problems.42
The lesson learned from this case study is that there is 
need for closer scrutiny of representation in key standards 
setting bodies affecting the SDH. What specific standards 
are set can affect vested interests positively or negatively. 
Efforts to address the SDH can be hindered by standards 
which unnecessarily restrict the capacity of the poor to 
participate in the world trading system, or by standards 
that insufficiently protect consumers. The political nature 
of decision making by standards setting bodies, like the 
CAC, should be acknowledged; even with a more equi-
table balance of representation by the diverse interests 
concerned, standards set by such bodies, and the science 
upon which they rest, should be critically reviewed by in-
dependent external panels annually.
3.4.3 Case study: The People’s Health Movement 
and its bottom-up approach
The People’s Health Movement (PHM) is a global net-
work of health activists and campaigners established in 
2000 seeking to revitalize the principles of the Alma-
Ata Declaration on Health for All and primary health 
care, and to revise international and domestic policies 
that negatively impact on health status and systems. 
In doing so, it has become an active supporter and 
critic of WHO. Built on grassroots participation and 
representation, PHM now has a presence in some 80 
countries. The PHM manifesto is the People’s Charter 
for Health (2000), now available in over 40 languages. 
The Charter embodies:
• an expression of PHM common concerns
• a vision for a better and healthier world
• a call for more radical action
• a tool for advocacy for people’s health
• a worldwide rallying manifesto for global 
health movements, as well as for networking 
and coalition building.
The objectives of the PHM are:
• To promote Primary Health Care (Health for 
All) as a key equity, participation and inter-
sectoral goal, as well as a human rights issue 
• To encourage governments and their health 
agencies to ensure universal access to quality 
health care, as well as to education and social 
services according to people’s needs and not 
people’s ability to pay 
• To promote the participation of people and 
people’s organizations in the formulation, 
implementation and monitoring of all health 
and social policies and program 
 Box 2.
SPS and the EU ban on hormone-
treated beef
The best known SPS case was an EU ban on foreign 
beef that contains artificial growth hormones 
banned in Europe because they may be 
carcinogenic. The dispute panel ruled against the 
EC ban partly because international standards had 
been set for five of the six hormones in question. 
The SPS (III.1) prefers government regulations to 
be based on international standards, specifically 
those of the Codex Alimentarius Commission. 
What the dispute panel ignored is that the Codex 
adopted a “safe” level of hormone use by a very 
narrow vote of 33 to 29, with seven abstentions 
(only country representatives are able to vote); 
and that Codex itself has been criticized for 
having an overwhelming majority of corporate 
scientists with very limited participation by civil 
society organizations. Standards-setting and risk 
assessments are not simply “scientific”, they are 
also political and contested, particularly in the 
case of uncertainty. In adhering narrowly to the 
requirement for a risk assessment, this decision 
placed the burden of proof on the EU to show that 
beef imports were unsafe, rather than on the USA 
and Canada, who brought the dispute forward, to 
show that they were safe.
Source: Labonté R, Sanger M. (2006) Glossary of the 
World Trade Organisation and Health: Part 1.  Journal of 
Epidemiology and Community Health, 60: 655-61.
 42  Hawkes C., Chopra M., Friel S., Thow A.M. (2007), “Globalization, food and nutrition transitions,” Discussion Paper, Globalization Knowledge Network, WHO
 Commission on the Social Determinants of Health.
Globalization, Global Governance and the Social Determinants of Health     51
• To promote health, equity and sustainable 
development as top priorities in local, national 
and international policymaking 
• To encourage people to develop their own 
solutions to local health problems 
• To hold local authorities, national govern-
ments, international organizations and corpo-
rations accountable for their actions, especially 
those related to the SDH. 
The PHM is coordinated by a global secretariat 
(previously in Bangalore, India and now in Cairo, 
Egypt), and supported by a steering group consisting 
of regional focal points, a smaller coordination com-
mittee and representatives of a number of specific 
“thematic circles”. The PHM is organized around 
geographic circles at country and regional levels, as 
well as issue-based thematic circles that are linked 
though local, national and international level cam-
paigns. India has the most organized “circle” and is 
present in many Indian states. PHM also maintains 
an active website (www.phmovement.org) and an 
active list server forum (pha-exchange@kabissa.org) 
which serve as lifelines for the organization. Finally, 
two world assemblies have been held to bring togeth-
er activists from the world over (Savar, Bangladesh 
2000; Cuenca, Ecuador 2005).
As a growing actor in global health governance, the 
significance of the PHM is:
• Its stance derives from perspectives gathered 
from a bottom-up decision-making process 
explicitly seeking to achieve participatory and 
democratic representation.
• Its membership is broadly based and focused 
at the grassroots level.
• It seeks to express the interests and perspec-
tives of the poor and marginalized from across 
the world (those who currently do not have 
sufficient voice and influence).
• It encourages people to develop their own 
local solutions.
• It recognizes diversity of interests and perspec-
tives in its activities.
• It encourages people to hold to account local 
authorities, national governments, interna-
tional organizations and national and transna-
tional corporations.
The lesson learned from this case study is there is a sig-
nificant and broadly based global constituency sufficiently 
dissatisfied with existing global governance institutions to 
organize an alternative forum. This coalition explicitly 
challenges the lack of democratic governance characterizing 
major global institutions, in favour of governance defined 
by participatory principles. One of the key purposes of the 
PHM has been to give a voice to those currently excluded 
from global forums, and to diversify the views represented 
within them as a means of improving the governance of 
global health.
3.5 Resource mobilization and allocation
A separate paper on international finance43 discusses 
financing mechanisms for allocating resources to the 
social sector including health, and how changes in 
global financing have an impact both on health status 
and the health sector.44 This section focuses on how 
the governance of financing of, and by, global institu-
tions support or undermine the SDH. How can we 
assess the quality of governance concerning the mobi-
lization and allocation of global resources in terms of 
their impact on the SDH? How can the global gover-
nance of financing be improved?
The foremost issue concerning the global governance 
of financing is how decisions are taken regarding the 
use of funds. This is directly related to the source of 
funding and how they are managed. Among health-
related organizations, WHO’s regular budget funds 
(RBFs), over which the organization has discretion-
ary control, has remained largely static in real terms, 
totalling US$915 million in 2006, as a result of the 
non-payment of arrears or freezing of contributions 
by some major donors. In contrast, extra-budgetary 
funds (EBFs), over which donors choose to exert vary-
ing degrees of control, have grown in relative terms 
since the early 1990s, reaching US$2,398 million in 
2006 (Lee and Buse 2006). Along with concerns about 
the sustainability of EBFs, there are questions about 
WHO’s capacity to establish a coherent work program 
given this funding structure. For donors seeking to 
demonstrate accountability to domestic constituencies 
 43   See Taylor, op.cit.
 44   See Rowson, op.cit. 
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in the relatively short term (i.e. political cycle), funds 
tend to be earmarked for vertical disease-focused ac-
tivities. As a result, longer term and large scale funding 
to tackle structural factors that contribute to ill health, 
receive limited support (Shiffman 2006). For example, 
substantial EBFs have been given to the Expanded Pro-
gram on Immunization (EPI) and GAVI to immunize 
against major childhood diseases. However, limited ef-
forts are made to address the social conditions in which 
children become more prone to such diseases, such as 
poverty, poor housing and sanitation.45
Funding of the UN system as a whole faces long-stand-
ing problems concerning the capacity of major finan-
cial contributors to use funding as a tool for furthering 
their political agendas. There are three main categories 
of UN expenditure: regular budget which is financed 
by a mandatory assessment from the member states; 
peacekeeping budget which is also financed by as-
sessment but is separate from the regular budget; and 
voluntary contributions which finance most of the hu-
manitarian relief and development agencies. Under this 
system, member states share in the financial support of 
core activities, but each country pursues its own priori-
ties in the other budgets. On grounds of dissatisfaction 
with the UN, some member states have refused to pay 
their assessed contributions in full or on time, leaving 
the UN system financially vulnerable. This is illustrated 
by the terms of the Helms-Biden Act whereby the US 
government has offered to pay a proportion of its UN 
arrears (US$1.3 billion) in return inter alia for reduc-
ing US assessed (from 25 per cent to 22 per cent) and 
peacekeeping contributions, and no growth of the UN 
budget in real terms. Substantial arrears of US$244 mil-
lion, not covered by the Helms-Biden Act, remain out-
standing, including US$214 million to various UN or-
ganizations (Biden 2001). Moreover, under the existing 
system, humanitarian relief and economic development 
are not considered core UN activities. For example, 
UNDP, UNICEF and UNFPA are all dependent on 
voluntary contributions. Correspondingly UN funding 
to address the SDH fall largely under voluntary contri-
butions, leaving initiatives subject to the decisions of 
donors, rather than embedded as a core budget line.
Given financial uncertainty and chronic underfunding, 
there have been increased efforts to secure alternative 
sources of funding for development purposes. One 
source has been the initiation of innovative funding 
mechanisms, such as the International Finance Facility 
(see 3.5.2) and UNITAID (see 3.5.3), to generate ad-
ditional resources, support acquisition of vital supplies, 
or provide increased bargaining power for countries in 
need. The PAHO Revolving Fund for Vaccine Procure-
ment, for example, was created in 1979 to 1) provide 
countries with a continuous supply of vaccines that 
meet PAHO/WHO standards at affordable prices; 2) 
enable countries to procure the required supplies of vac-
cines and syringes for immunization activities, thereby 
preventing interruptions due to lack of vaccines or im-
mediate funds; 3) facilitate the use of local currency for 
the reimbursement of invoices; 4) consolidate vaccine 
and syringe contracts for bulk purchasing, which results 
in more advantageous prices and improved delivery; 5) 
assure quality of vaccines being used in national im-
munization programs; and 6) establish procedures with 
suppliers to permit urgent orders to be placed and de-
livered on short notice (PAHO n.d.).
Another important funding source has been the private 
sector and civil society (Piore 2002; Richter 2004). Phil-
anthropic organizations, which straddle the two spheres, 
have become especially prominent in global health since 
the 1990s (Cohen 1999) with the scale of their resources 
raising familiar questions about the governance of such 
funds. As well as concerns about donor driven decision-
making, existing problems of coordination, short-term 
emphasis on disease-focused interventions, and the cre-
ation of undue burdens on recipient countries may be 
worsened (Barder and Birdsall 2006).
Finally, there has been substantial funding of global 
public-private partnerships since the mid 1990s, largely 
targeted at specific diseases or health issues (Buse and 
Walt 2000). There has been limited critical analysis of 
GPPPs, including how they are funded and for what 
purposes. In relation to the SDH, given their disease-
focused nature, existing GPPPs are unlikely to be ap-
propriate mechanisms. There are also concerns about 
 45  For a fuller discussion of WHO finances, see Vaughan J.P., Mogedal S., Kruse S., Lee K., Walt G., de Wilde K. (1995), Cooperation for Health Development: Extrabudgetary 
funding in the World Health Organization (Oslo: Governments of Australia, Norway and UK), ISBN 82-71-77 3941; and Lucas A., Mogedal S., Walt G., Hodne Steen 
S., Kruse S.E., Lee K., and Hawken L. (1997), Cooperation for Health Development, The World Health Organisation’s support to programmes at country level (London: 
Governments of Australia, Canada, Italy, Norway, Sweden and UK).
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potential conflicts of interest between the need to tackle 
issues such as poverty and inequality through funda-
mental structural change, and the vested interests of 
private sector “partners” in the existing economic or-
der.
Overall there remain stark irrationalities in funding, 
apparent both within and across health-related insti-
tutions. As long as funding for development purposes 
remains voluntary, and major donor countries earmark 
such funds to satisfy domestic constituencies, limited 
global resources will be available to address the SDH. 
Moreover, it may be argued that the funding decisions 
of health-related institutions can only have marginal ef-
fect unless core institutions in global governance, nota-
bly the IFIs, act to change underlying global economic 
and political structures that impact on the SDH. To 
address these problems, a range of ideas have been put 
forth to make better use of existing resources, and to 
mobilize new sources of financing (Kaul and Conceição 
2006).
3.5.1 Case study: The finances of the Global Fund  
  to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
The aim of the Global Fund is to raise US$7-10 bil-
lion annually to fight three major diseases. While falling 
far short of this sum thus far, pledges have increased to 
reach US$2 billion in 2006 (see Pledges and Contri-
butions, www.theglobalfund.org). The Global Fund’s 
structure as a public-private partnership was expected 
to result in substantial funding from non-traditional 
sources, notably the private sector. To date the Global 
Fund has relied almost exclusively on traditional devel-
opment aid, as private sector contributions have been 
negligible.
On the allocation of resources, the Fund is a financing 
mechanism, not an implementing agency. Thus, it does 
not have a country presence but focuses on providing 
support to projects proposed by governments (Princi-
pal Recipients). For the first five funding rounds, 57 
per cent of the funds have gone to HIV/AIDS related 
projects, 27 per cent to malaria and 15 per cent to tu-
berculosis. In terms of geographic distribution, 55 per 
cent has been given to countries in sub Saharan Africa, 
14 per cent to East Asia and the Pacific Region, and 
9 per cent to South Asia, the Middle East and North 
Africa. Both Latin America and the Caribbean, and 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia, have each received 
11 per cent of funds. Much of the Fund’s support has 
gone to financing drugs to prevent and treat the three 
diseases, with 48 per cent of the funds used to procure 
drugs and commodities.  Another 22 per cent has been 
used to support human resources and training, and 11 
per cent on infrastructure and equipment. Most funds 
have gone to government (64 per cent), with NGOs 
(12 per cent), multilateral agencies (18 per cent) and 
the private sector (4 per cent) receiving the remainder.
A more detailed analysis of the Fund’s governance is 
provided above (Section 3.4.1) and in a separate Com-
mission paper.46 Criticisms of its role as a financing 
mechanism have included the following:
• The Fund has not attracted the anticipated 
amounts of funds, and concerns of sustain-
ability are raised in terms of programs initiated, 
and the possibility of starting new programs.
• There are concerns that resources for the Fund 
are from existing development aid resources. 
This may impact on the sustainability of other 
development efforts. Overall total volume of 
ODA decreased substantially during the early 
1990s (an era of “trade not aid”), a trend that 
only recently began to reverse.47 Proportionate 
and absolute funding levels for health, however, 
have steadily increased.48,49 
• The Fund channels resources for three dis-
eases and there are concerns this biomedical 
focus compromises the development of more 
comprehensive health systems. Round Five 
of funding has invited specific proposals for 
strengthening health systems and human 
resources to promote greater access to the 
products and services previously funded.
 46  See Hanefield et al., op.cit.
 47  Debt cancellation continues to be counted as ODA contributions and has meant that little new net funding in the past two years has been contributed, although foregone 
 debt repayment does increase revenues in eligible debt-relief countries for public spending on health and other SDH. Once debt cancellation to just two countries (Iraq and 
Nigeria) is removed, however, total ODA and debt cancellation in 2006 was actually below levels in 2005.
 48  OECD (2000) Recent trends in official development assistance to health. (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, September).
 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/12/0/6877046.pdf (accessed September 20, 2006)
 49  See Taylor S., op.cit.
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• The Fund is strongly focused on health tech-
nologies and gives limited attention to struc-
tural factors impacting on the diseases, such as 
poverty, gender or multi-sectoral approaches. 
This appears to reflect the process by which 
proposals are put forth by Principle Recipients, 
reviewed by the Technical Review Panels, and 
funded in terms of performance.
The lesson learned from this case study is that the Global 
Fund has not attracted the amount of new funding hoped 
for by the global health community to tackle three major 
diseases, and practically no funds have come from new 
sources.  Efforts have been made to disburse funds to recipi-
ent countries in ways that support national governments 
and health systems. However, efforts to strengthen health 
systems development have thus far been remained modest.  
The creation of the Global Fund to vertically focus on three 
diseases, and the ways in which decisions are taken to al-
locate funding, means that limited attention so far is being 
given to addressing the SDH.
3.5.2 Case study: The International Finance Facility
The UK government launched a proposal in January 
2003 for an International Finance Facility (IFF) de-
signed to aid achievement of the MDGs. It is esti-
mated that development assistance must double (an 
increase of at least US$50 billion per year), and be fo-
cused on the poorest countries, if the MDGs are to be 
met. By comparison, donor governments at the UN 
International Conference on Financing in Monterrey 
in 2002 pledged an additional US$16 billion a year 
from 2006.
To bridge this resource gap, the IFF is a financing 
mechanism which would provide up to US$50 billion 
per year in development assistance between now and 
2015. It would leverage this additional money from the 
international capital markets by issuing bonds, based 
on legally binding long-term donor commitments. The 
IFF would be responsible for repaying bondholders us-
ing future donor payment streams, and would disburse 
resources through existing multilateral and bilateral 
mechanisms. Since its launch, the proposed IFF is de-
scribed as receiving “broad interest and support from 
the emerging markets, developing countries, “interna-
tional institutions, faith communities, NGOs and busi-
ness” (UK HM Treasury 2006).
In 2005 the International Finance Facility for Immu-
nization (IFFIm) was formed for “frontloading” (up 
front investment) aid for immunization programs and 
health systems development to 2015. An anticipated 
IFFIm investment of US$4 billion is expected to pre-
vent 5 million child deaths between 2005 and 2015, 
and more than 5 million future adult deaths. Supported 
by Brazil, France, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the 
UK, the scheme funds the GAVI Alliance (formerly the 
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization). The 
IFFIm will have a financial base comprised of legally 
binding payment obligations from sovereign donors. It 
will borrow operating funds in the international capital 
markets over the next 10 years, up to a prudently lim-
ited proportion of the sovereign obligations making up 
its financial base (gearing ratio). Given the strength of 
its backing from largely triple-A-rated sponsors, and its 
conservative financial policies, IFFIm is expected to be 
rated triple-A by credit rating agencies.
In terms of governance the IFF is potentially innova-
tive. As a funding mechanism, it offers more reliable 
and predictable funding than traditional development 
aid. This is because it is not reliant on annual decisions 
regarding public expenditure on aid budgets and thus 
the changeable political climate of individual countries. 
This means that potentially it would be more responsive 
to funding needs over a longer timeframe. However, 
there remain concerns about the funding mechanism 
itself, and whether it addresses underlying weaknesses 
in the governance of development finance. Issues re-
garding the scheme itself include the following:
• Some analysts have questioned the capacity 
of the poorest countries to spend such large 
amounts of aid (US$50 billion annually), and 
of their economies to cope with such rapid 
change (Mavrotas 2003), suggesting a need 
to consider means of increasing such capacity 
ahead of major increases in disbursements.50
 50  There are concerns that scaling up aid disbursements to developing countries lead to so-called “Dutch disease” (DD) which effects growth and human development, 
 notably as a result of inflation and exchange rate appreciation.  The UN Millennium Project argues strongly against this problem.  See Chapter 17 at 
 http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/reports/fullreport.htm. The IMF (2005) finds no DD effect in sample countries and concludes that the empirical evidence is ”mixed”. 
 Research for the IMF by Rajan and Subramanian (2005a; 2005b) also suggests that the overall effect is not statistically significant.
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• The need for bonds to be serviced and 
repaid from future aid budgets suggests that 
future (post-2015) aid disbursements will be 
reduced unless such payments are explicitly 
excluded from donor countries’ commit-
ments to provide 0.7 per cent of their gross 
national income in aid.
• How can the rich countries justify paying 
US$220-US$244 billion in interest charges 
to (presumably) wealthy bondholders over 
the life of the Facility (Moss 2005), rather 
than devoting these resources directly to 
meeting basic needs in developing countries?
• In that regard, would the IFF actually con-
tribute to increased global income inequali-
ties, as compared with the counterfactual of 
a system of tied international taxes using a 
broad and generally progressive international 
tax base (Jubilee Research 2003)?
Many concerns about the governance of the IFF focus 
on who will decide how the funding mechanism will 
work, and how funds will be spent. A report by the 
World Development Movement (2005) acknowledg-
es the treasury’s plan to provide funds as grants, debt 
relief and highly concessional loans and use existing 
institutional structures. However, it raises questions 
about what proportion of funds will be disbursed 
through multilateral versus bilateral channels, given 
the commitment to take donor preferences into ac-
count when deciding which countries will receive 
funds and how. Moss (2005) challenges the capacity 
of the IFF to raise additional resources for develop-
ment, and argues that the benefits will be outweighed 
by its additional financing costs. Finally, what “high 
level principles” will specifically apply to how donors 
disburse IFF funds, and its actual governance struc-
ture remains subject to negotiation. This includes 
how recipient countries will “have a significant role 
within the facility”. In short, while the potential for 
the IFF to mobilize substantial funds for the MDGs 
have been welcome in many quarters, governance is-
sues concerning how the funds will be managed and 
disbursed require careful consideration.
The lesson learned from this case study is that there is a 
need for innovative ways of raising additional resources 
for development purposes. How effectively and equitably 
such funds will be raised and used, to tackle the un-
derlying structural causes of poverty and ill-health will 
depend also on innovative governance of such funds. 
Additional funds without addressing the dominance of 
donors in how funds are used may simply add to the 
shortfalls of existing funding mechanisms. Funding 
models that essentially borrow from the future through 
the sale of bonds must further ensure that the public 
costs of that borrowing do not increase income inequali-
ties by dent of who is most able or likely to purchase 
such bonds.
3.5.3 Case study: UNITAID
Also known as the International Drug Purchasing 
Facility, UNITAID was launched in 2006 by Brazil, 
Chile, Norway and France, with support from about 
40 other countries, international organizations, 
NGOs, and private foundations. The idea is to levy a 
surcharge on airplane tickets, which will vary accord-
ing to destination and travel class, in implementing 
countries (to date Brazil, Chile, Congo, Cyprus, 
Gabon, Côte d’Ivoire, France, Jordan, Luxembourg, 
Madagascar, Mauritius, Nicaragua, Norway and the 
United Kingdom) to raise funds for purchasing drugs 
for HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria and support 
public health systems in poor countries. As described 
by UNITAID, “Air transport is one of the industries 
that benefits most from globalization with an average 
annual growth of 5 per cent. It is therefore appropri-
ate for this industry to help redistribute the benefits 
of globalization. Using differentiated rates according 
to the travel classes ensures that efforts are distrib-
uted fairly among passengers” (UNITAID n.d.). Ad-
ditional multi-year budgetary assistance will also be 
provided from other countries.
It is believed that this scheme will better respond to 
the needs of poor countries in terms of production 
volume, price level and drug suitability. It also pro-
vides a more sustainable, and a growing source of, 
funding in the longer term. Moreover, UNITAID 
can use its purchasing power to leverage price reduc-
tions for quality drugs and diagnostics, and acceler-
ate the pace at which they are made available.
UNITAID is described as complementary to existing 
organizations, such as WHO, UNAIDS, UNICEF and 
the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Malaria and Tubercu-
losis. It does not seek to replace existing organizations 
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that help facilitate access to drugs by poor countries. 
Instead, it plans not to setting up a new bureaucracy, 
forging partnerships with existing bodies and ini-
tiatives, and thus reducing the risk of duplication. 
Specific details on the governance and operation of 
UNITAID have yet to be defined. According to its 
website, this will result from “broad consultations 
with the players concerned as well as NGOs and civil 
society.”
The lesson learned from this case study is that there are 
opportunities to raise tax revenues from activities aris-
ing from increased globalization. Like the IFF, how-
ever, raising additional funding must be accompanied 
by appropriate governance mechanisms that ensure that 
funds are used to address the SDH.
3.6 Leadership in global governance and the SDH
Leadership can be defined as “the ability of an individ-
ual to influence, motivate, and enable others to con-
tribute toward the effectiveness and success of the or-
ganizations of which they are members” (House 2004, 
p. 15). Bull (1977) argues that the contemporary state 
system is anarchical in that there is no higher level of 
authority over states, with each state exercising sover-
eignty over its territory and citizens. In international 
relations order is provided through common rules and 
institutions through which an international society is 
formed.
It is useful to reflect on the nature of leadership in 
global governance, how it is distributed among key 
institutions, and how such leadership (or lack of it) 
impacts on the SDH. As the recognized exercise of au-
thority, leadership is clearly lacking in health- and non 
health-focused institutions relevant to the SDH. With 
formal authority residing with sovereign states, inter-
governmental organizations remain subject to the will 
of member states. State compliance with international 
treaties, such as the FCTC, depends on acquiescence 
by states, with sanctions for non-compliance often re-
maining non-enforceable. There are few examples of 
states conceding their sovereignty, to “supranational” 
organizations with higher powers.  Certain functions 
of the European Union are perhaps the best example, 
although trade treaties – because of enforceable sanc-
tions – also represent degrees of erosion of national 
sovereignty.
Amid the absence of overarching legal or political au-
thority at the global level, other forms of leadership 
become important. Technical leadership in health 
can be identified as broadly residing in WHO. As a 
UN specialized agency, WHO is widely recognized as 
having access to unrivalled technical knowledge and 
expertise in health. Member states, notably low- and 
middle-income countries, look to it to undertake a 
wide range of activities, such as assigning nomencla-
ture, issuing guidelines and standards, and reviewing 
and coordinating research. While other institutions 
hold specialist expertise on selected areas, WHO and 
its extensive global networks can provide such broadly 
based health expertise. The key question, however, 
is whether technical leadership alone is sufficient to 
achieve real progress on the SDH?
Moral or ethical leadership can also be considered 
an important factor in global governance. This is the 
power to influence public opinion and behaviour with 
or without recourse to political or legal authority. 
Such power arises from shared support of certain val-
ues and principles seen as underlying decision-mak-
ing and action. It is clear that fundamental decisions 
that affect the SDH all have nominative dimensions. 
These include the allocation of scarce resources, access 
to health care, and priority setting across populations 
and their needs. During its first two decades, WHO’s 
strong biomedical focus brought limited engagement 
with such value-laden choices. However, by the 1970s 
its attempt to address broader determinants of health 
was driven by principles of social justice, fairness and 
equity. These include such groundbreaking initiatives 
as primary health care (PHC), the essential medicines 
list and the International Code on the Marketing of 
Breastmilk Substitutes. Some high-income countries 
argued that WHO was engaging inappropriately in 
“political” issues. Others applauded it for demonstrat-
ing moral (and political) courage and leadership, and 
encouraged its role in acting as “the world’s health 
conscience” (Kickbusch 1997) by challenging power-
ful vested interests. CSOs representing vulnerable and 
marginalized populations are seen as playing a simi-
lar role. The moral and ethical perspectives of differ-
ent global institutions compete today for leadership 
amid a more crowded policy space in global health 
(Lee and Buse 2006; Horton 2006). The ascendance 
of the World Bank and the creation of global public-
private partnerships (Buse and Walt 2000) not only 
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reflect the political and economic balance of power, 
but also the power to lead through ideas, values and 
ethics. Advocates of the human rights-based approach 
(HRBA) see this framework as a much needed return 
to an ethical and political focus indispensable for revi-
talizing leadership in global health.
Finally, leadership unequivocally arises from control 
of financial and other resources. While WHO may 
exert technical and moral leadership, its relatively 
limited resources and human rights orientation pre-
vent it from exercising this leadership effectively. 
Moreover, the growth of health sector lending by the 
World Bank, together with the creation and funding 
of GPPPs, has undermined WHO’s capacity to carry 
out its mandate with commensurate policy decisions 
and actions.
Overall no single institution is recognized as provid-
ing decisive leadership in global governance related 
to the SDH. Instead, there are different forms of 
leadership that reside in different institutions. While 
this may be seen positively as a rational division of 
labour based on comparative advantage, in reality 
it is more a misalignment of different types of au-
thority. The World Bank has relatively substantial 
resources to address the SDH, but it is mistrusted in 
many countries and large portions of the NGO com-
munity, not least because of the shortcomings in its 
governance structure. WHO has recognized techni-
cal expertise, but limited financial means and has to 
rely on other institutions to apply this expertise. The 
PHM is vying for a more prominent position in this 
misalignment.
Most problematic is the perceived erosion of the 
ethical authority of WHO. While Bale (2003) calls 
for WHO to “build partnerships with the pharma-
ceutical industry”, Hardon (2003) argues that WHO 
has come under undue commercial influence at the 
expense of equity-focused policies. Horton (2003) 
warns of “a damaging reinterpretation” of WHO’s 
mandate. The diversity of institutional actors con-
cerned with global governance is accompanied by 
a split of ideologies and value systems underlying 
their actions.  Consensus around certain normative 
principles — such as social justice and equity — has 
strengthened in many institutions, though actions 
have not necessarily always followed. At the same 
time, other value systems — such as economic and 
managerial efficiency — remain dominant. This has 
resulted in an increased emphasis on short-term re-
sults being monitored and evaluated, as well as in an 
increased use of new health technologies, (i.e. em-
phasis has been on technology-centred vertical ap-
proaches that fit with these premises). 
3.6.1 Case study: The global public goods approach
The concept of global public goods is based on the 
premise that “[i]n today’s world, globalization has 
brought about interdependencies that blur the dis-
tinction between domestic and external affairs. The 
best way to ensure one’s own well-being is to be con-
cerned about that of others” (Kaul and Faust 2001, p. 
869). The concept of global public goods (GPGs) is 
intended to help determine when governments should 
work collectively to address an issue of shared interest 
based on the distinction between “private” and “pub-
lic” goods. A pure “private good” (e.g. a cake) is one 
whereby consumption can be withheld until payment 
is made and, once consumed, cannot be consumed 
again. A pure public good (e.g. a lighthouse) has two 
important characteristics: (a) use by one individual 
does not limit its use by others of the same good; and 
(b) once provided it is available to all others (Wood-
ward and Smith 2003). Traditionally governments are 
expected to play an active role in providing public 
goods as, left solely to the market, such goods would 
be undersupplied.
In recent years, the concept of public goods has been 
applied to the health field in an effort to distinguish 
what functions can best be fulfilled by the state or by 
the market. The prevention, control and treatment of 
communicable diseases can be usefully understood in 
this way. All individuals within a society benefit from 
minimizing the spread of communicable diseases. Fur-
thermore, there are certain market failures that would 
lead to the undersupply of many goods:
• There is little incentive for individuals to 
privately invest in such goods. Benefits from 
the creation of a disease surveillance system 
are shared by all within a society and cannot 
be withheld until payment is received. 
Individuals benefit from disease surveillance 
whether or not they have paid.
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• The problem of “free riders” will arise if 
certain functions, such as immunization pro-
grams, are left to the market. While a popula-
tion’s collective risk from measles, for example, 
declines at a given rate of vaccination, there 
may be an individual incentive to “free ride” 
on the compliance of others. If sufficient 
numbers acted in this way, and immunization 
coverage declined sufficiently, this could lead 
to a disease outbreak that would pose a risk to 
all non-immunized individuals.
• Because they affect limited numbers or mar-
ginal populations, there are certain health 
needs that do not offer a sufficient economic 
return to entice the market into action. 
So-called neglected diseases attract inadequate 
attention by pharmaceutical companies, 
for example, because of the small numbers 
affected or the inability of sufferers to pay 
for treatment. In such cases, governments are 
required to mobilize alternative resources or 
create additional incentives to address such 
diseases.
• Increased health risks can arise from indi-
vidual or collective behaviours which represent 
a negative externality (public bad) for society. 
Regulatory measures are needed to ensure that 
such behaviours (e.g. smoking) are minimized.
• Situations where action leads to collective 
benefits rather than individual gain require 
governments to pool costs among all indi-
viduals. The overall benefit to society of, for 
example, a disease surveillance system far 
exceeds its cost, but only if this cost is collec-
tively shared. Similarly, the cost-effectiveness 
of disease eradication (e.g. polio) cannot be 
realized unless governments invest in such 
campaigns.
• If left to the market alone, public goods are 
not produced in sufficient quantity and it 
becomes necessary for governments to act.
The concept of GPGs is increasingly prominent in 
high-level policy discussions of financing for global 
health and the MDGs. In relation to the SDH, how-
ever, how useful is it? Deneulin and Townsend (2006) 
argue that the concept may not be an appropriate 
paradigm for the development of global strategies to 
improve well-being. Mooney and Dzator (2003) simi-
larly argue that GPGs do not sufficiently address is-
sues of equity in health outcomes. Smith et al. (2003) 
propose collective action in collective interest as an al-
ternative and broader organizing principle for similar 
reasons. In short, GPGs’ underlying premise is that 
shared interests are the key rationale for collective ac-
tion. As UN agencies, and particularly the UNDP 
and WHO, continue to advance work on the GPGs 
concept, it is important that ongoing research on the 
equity implications of the concept be strongly sup-
ported.
The lesson learned from this case study is that approaches 
that appeal to utilitarian principles can encourage pow-
erful interests to contribute to global initiatives if self-in-
terest is recognised. However, the concept of global public 
goods has limited applicability to many of the SDH, and 
is therefore unlikely to provide a sufficient rationale for 
generating global leadership.
3.6.2 Case study: The Right to Health
The Office of the United Nations’ High Commission-
er for Human Rights (2006) defines the human-rights 
based approach (HRBA) as “a conceptual framework 
for the process of human development that is norma-
tively based on international human rights standards 
and operationally directed to promoting and protect-
ing human rights. It seeks to analyse inequalities which 
lie at the heart of development problems and redress 
discriminatory practices and unjust distributions of 
power that impede development progress.” Key legal 
texts include: 
• The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) which states that: “Everyone 
has the right to a standard of living adequate 
for the health and well-being of himself and 
his [sic] family” (Article 25)
• The 1966 International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which 
specifies the “right of everyone to the enjoy-
ment of the highest attainable standard of 
physical and mental health” (Article 12)
• General Comment 14 by the UN Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(2000) which sets out states’ specific legal 
obligations “to respect, protect and fulfil” the 
rights cited under Article 12.
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These obligations are explicated by Chapman (2002) 
and Nygren-Krug (2002). Conventional wisdom is 
that they apply only to the actions of national govern-
ments with respect to people living within their borders. 
But, even apart from the 1966 Covenant, philosopher 
Thomas Pogge argues that cross-border obligations 
follow from Article 28 of the UDHR, which specifies 
that, “Everyone is entitled to a social and international 
order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in 
this Declaration can be fully realized.” In the context 
of globalization, the human rights rubric is especially 
valuable since, if human rights are to be meaningful at 
all, they cannot be contingent on validation with ref-
erence to some external criterion such as one’s wealth 
or economic productivity. It thus provides a basis with 
a foundation in international law for challenging ero-
sions of health equity associated with the emergence 
of a global marketplace.  
No effective supranational mechanisms analogous to 
the institutions of trade policy and law exist to ensure 
respect for these requirements, which represents a glar-
ing deficiency in the institutions of global governance. 
In 1997, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated 
 Box 3.
The People’s Health Movement and 
the Human Rights Based Approach
The HRBA is about the more equitable distribution of 
resources in society according to need, and health is 
identified as one of the key entry points to achieving this 
goal. There is a broad range of human rights embodied 
in international agreements. Those most relevant to the 
SDH are:
• The right to life, liberty and security of a person
• The right to the highest attainable standard of 
health
• The right to fair and favourable working conditions
• The right to adequate food, housing and social 
security
• The right to education.
Led by the People’s Health Movement, advocates of 
the HRBA believe that, to tackle the SDH, the approach 
can be incorporated as a positive force in global 
governance institutions, notably WHO, UNICEF, the World 
Bank, GFATM, UNFPA and UNAIDS, as well as be applied 
at the country level (People’s Health Movement, 2006). 
Doing so, however, will require changes to the mandates 
of these organizations and a fundamental shift in 
paradigm. More detailed independent evaluation is 
needed of the extent to which the relevant institutions 
presently incorporate a HRBA in their work, and how 
different institutions can incorporate the HRBA in their 
policies as soon as possible.  
The PHM launched a global campaign in 2006 to 
strengthen the “right to health” (RTH), with a focus 
on defending and operationalizing the “right to 
health care” by mobilizing action from below. The 
campaign looks at what measures are needed to 
tackle human rights violations in the context of a 
broader analysis of power and social inequalities. It 
seeks social transformations indispensable to resolving 
such inequalities as they affect health. As such, the 
campaign focuses on changing national and global 
health sector reform policies that affect access to 
health care by the poor, the disadvantaged and the 
marginalized. It also seeks to put in place mechanisms 
to effectively redistribute resources.
The role played by PHM activists is to document 
violations of the Right to Health and its underlying 
determinants, and to plan joint action with claim holders 
and duty bearers to stop these violations. Capacity 
building of PHM cadres and partners in civil society, 
responsible for calling duty bearers to account, is seen 
as indispensable in this process of social mobilization. 
During the campaign, the documenting of violations will 
not be restricted to those in the sphere of health care, 
but will encompass denouncing violations of health 
rights related to the various SDH. The country circles will 
continue to expand their involvement in local initiatives 
that tackle the most important SDH concerning the 
violation of health rights.  
PHM is counting on the potential of major social 
mobilization to achieve change as much as the RTH 
care campaign demands for decision-makers to take 
responsibility. The campaign also focuses on processes 
that lead to potentially concrete outcomes for which 
beneficiaries have genuine claims. In phase I of 
the campaign, PHM will carry out about 30 country 
assessments of the status of the RTH case.
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that all UN bodies were to apply the HRBA. How-
ever, how this should be done and what this meant 
for each UN agency remained unclear. This suggests 
that more detailed independent evaluation is needed 
of the extent to which relevant institutions presently 
incorporate a HRBA in their work, and how different 
institutions can incorporate the HRBA in their poli-
cies as soon as possible. In 2002 the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights appointed a Special 
Rapporteur on the right to health for a three-year pe-
riod (an appointment renewed in 2005) with the fol-
lowing tasks:
(a) gather, request, receive and exchange right to 
health information from all relevant sources; 
(b) dialogue and discuss possible areas of coop-
eration with all relevant actors, including 
Governments, relevant United Nations bodies, 
specialized agencies and programmes, in par-
ticular WHO and the Joint United Nations 
Programme on HIV/AIDS, as well as NGOs 
and international financial institutions; 
(c) report on the status, throughout the world, of 
the right to health, including laws, policies, 
good practices and obstacles; and
(d) make recommendations on appropriate 
measures that promote and protect the right 
to health.51
Since his appointment to the post, the Special Rap-
porteur (Paul Hunt; http//www.ohchr.org/english/is-
sues/health/right/index.htm) has addressed issues that 
affect the right to health. They include health worker 
migration, poverty reduction strategies, trade agree-
ments, health systems, mental health care, neglected 
diseases, access to medicines, maternal mortality and 
indigenous populations (Hunt 2003a, 2003b, 2004a, 
2004b, 2004c, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2005d, 2006a, 
2006b). Most recently (Hunt 2007), he has provided 
examples of the operationalization of the Article 12 
obligations within individual national jurisdictions. 
The role of the Special Rapporteur is arguably valu-
able in continuing to bring national and international 
attention to potential abrogation of this right through 
other multilateral or global policies. It is recommend-
ed here that an independent evaluation of the poli-
cy impact of the Special Rapporteur be undertaken, 
along with consideration of establishing the post per-
manently and of alternative ways of establishing the 
HRBA as a cornerstone of multilateral institutions’ 
approach to global health governance. 
The lesson learned from this case study is that the human 
rights-based approach offers a framework for tackling the 
SDH directly. It represents a fundamental shift in the 
current development paradigm, towards massive capac-
ity building, concerted efforts to document violations of 
the right to health care, and a revising of the mandate of 
WHO and organizations working with it. The approach 
has received growing attention and support from UN or-
ganizations and a growing number of NGOs. The role of 
the UN Special Rapporteur has been critically important 
and should continue as a permanent post.
 51  Personal communication, Jude de Bueno Mesquita, Office of the UN Commissioner on Human Rights, 2006.
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This wide-ranging review can only provide a par-tial view of the diverse and complex governance 
challenges faced in efforts to address the SDH. None-
theless, a number of conclusions can be drawn from 
the analysis:
1. The past two to three decades have brought 
a period of transition from international to 
global governance including health gover-
nance. Societies around the world are faced 
with the challenge of finding more effective 
means of collectively addressing issues of 
global relevance.
2. Global governance should not be assumed to 
apply to all spheres or levels of social coopera-
tion. Global governance may be needed when 
interests, rights and obligations are shared 
across constituencies, but are not being 
furthered by individual governments acting 
alone. Global governance may be appropriate 
where the articulation of shared interests, the 
establishment of rights and obligations and 
the mediation of differences require collective 
action by more than one state (e.g. air traffic 
control, migration). Where such interests, 
rights, obligations and differences can be 
addressed within a lower level of the jurisdic-
tion, other levels of governance may apply.
3. The SDH address how societal conditions 
affect health status, abilities to remain healthy 
or cope with illness and preventable ill health. 
How globalization impacts on the SDH is 
the subject of other GKN discussion papers. 
However, an understanding of those linkages 
requires assessment of the governance of the 
institutional actors involved. This concerns 
the nature of governance of individual global 
institutions, as well as the global governance 
architecture as a whole, as they pertain to the 
SDH. 
4. The emergent global governance architecture 
relevant to the SDH is characterized by the 
following features:
Globalization, Global Governance and
the Social Determinants of Health:
A review of the linkages
and agenda for action
4.0 Conclusions
and recommendations
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• There is “thick” governance52 in certain issue 
areas, notably economic relations such as 
trade, investment and finance, but “thinner” 
governance in other issue areas notably the 
social sectors. This uneven level of global 
governance reflects the extreme inequality 
of de facto and de jure power, with the result 
that the world economy is managed in ways 
that systematically enhance the interests and 
magnify the power of the already wealthy and 
powerful, while reinforcing existing dynamics 
of marginalization and disempowerment and 
creating new dynamics with the same effect. 
Despite increased recent attention to selected 
global health issues, resulting in the creation 
of various individual initiatives, addressing the 
SDH has not yet been given sufficient priority 
in the building and running of effective global 
governance institutions.
• The relative balance of power among state, 
market and civil society institutions has 
shifted radically in recent decades. The private 
sector (market) and civil society have gained 
more prominent roles at the global level, 
including institutions concerned with global 
health, while state institutions have seen a 
relative decline. There has also been a shift in 
power, from social and political institutions 
(e.g. WHO, ECOSOC), to those concerned 
with management of the world economy (e.g. 
IMF, World Bank, WTO).
• Within each type of institution, there is a 
greater concentration of power into fewer 
hands at the global level. Large transnational 
corporations, major industrialized countries 
and mostly Northern-based “international” 
non-government organizations have come 
to dominate global governance, while many 
remain marginalized by the current archi-
tecture. Economic globalization defined by 
economic growth has been prioritized over 
social and environmental protection.
• A certain degree of innovation has characterized 
some mechanisms within global institutions 
concerned with the SDH. Of particular note 
are institutions, such as the GFATM, which 
bring together state and non-state actors for the 
purpose of addressing issue areas that cross or 
circumvent national borders. However, these 
innovations to broaden representation within 
global governance with non-state actors, most 
notably the corporate sector, has been accom-
panied with the simultaneous reduction of the 
power of the competent UN bodies, and have 
in that way been conducive to further fragmen-
tation and confusion of the global governance 
on these essential health issues. 
5. There has been increased attention to the 
SDH through poverty reduction strategies 
and the MDGs in a number of global institu-
tions. However, there remain concerns that 
these initiatives have lacked genuine com-
mitment and been narrowly interpreted in 
their implementation, focusing on technical 
interventions and measurable outcomes rather 
than on underlying structural factors. The 
MDG to reduce poverty is a notable excep-
tion, although both its ambition (reduce by 
half ) and its metric (poverty at US$1-a-day 
level) have been criticized as inadequate in the 
context of the growth in global wealth (Pogge 
2004; Reddy and Pogge 2005). For example, 
Edward (2006) proposes an ethical poverty 
line based on life expectancy to replace the 
US$1-a-day metric.
6. In addition, the focus of many GPPPs is on 
disease-oriented activities and biomedical 
interventions, as opposed to changing the 
broader structural conditions which affect 
the SDH. Similarly, the SDH are not easily 
translated into results-based approaches as 
those adopted by the private sector, such as 
pilot funding and rapid measurable results, 
which have gained widespread popularity 
among donors. In addition, there is a ten-
dency for health-based institutions to propose 
solutions and actions that primarily fall within 
their own somewhat narrow or biomedically 
inscribed mandates, rather than recommenda-
tions that are more dependent on activities of 
 52  The concept of “thick” and “thin” governance is defined by Held et al. (1999) in reference to the degree to which governance institutions have formed around a 
 given issue-area.
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other organizations. This leads to compart-
mentalization, lack of effective overall coordi-
nation mechanisms, and insufficient attention 
being paid to the SDH by the former institu-
tions. The need to reorient medical research, 
to take greater account of neglected diseases 
and their underlying and structural causes, has 
repeatedly been stressed by the global health 
and development policy communities, but to 
date to limited effect.
7. Any efforts to address the links between global 
governance and the SDH require engagement 
with both health and non health-focused 
institutions. However, this is not easy due the 
range of institutions involved. Where power-
ful non-health interests prevail, there are pro-
found difficulties in gaining sufficient atten-
tion and political priority for health issues in 
general and for the SDH in particular.
8. There is strong evidence at the national level 
that good governance is an important factor 
in addressing the SDH (Sen 1981; Lake 2001; 
Franco et al. 2004; Ruger 2005). Strengths 
and weaknesses in national governance might 
be applied to the global level where there 
is a need for fuller assessment of how good 
governance contributes to tackling the SDH. 
For example, lessons from the national level 
suggest that health-based administration is 
essential for intersectoral policy making. If 
transferred to the global level, WHO should 
play an equivalent role in supporting global 
policy making on the SDH.
9. A broad concept of good governance, includ-
ing issues of power, offers a more appropriate 
framework for assessing the quality of emerg-
ing forms of global governance than one 
focused for example on public sector man-
agement. Such a framework (a) assesses the 
governance of state and non-state institutions; 
(b) uses criteria which go beyond measures of 
technocratic or administrative effectiveness; 
and (c) includes critical assessment of the 
quality and functioning of political processes 
and systems within and across relevant 
institutions.
10. This paper’s review of selected global institu-
tions, against key criteria of good governance, 
points to a number of weaknesses that are 
detrimental to tackling the SDH:
• The long-standing problems of coordination and 
coherence, characterizing global institutions 
in general, extend to institutions concerned 
with the SDH. These problems remain despite 
efforts to encourage greater cohesion among: 
(a) organizations operating within a single 
country or region (e.g. donor consortium); (b) 
organizations working across sectors (SWAp); 
and (c) organizations working on the same 
thematic area (e.g. PRSP) or health-related 
issue (e.g. UN Ad Hoc Inter-agency Task 
Force on Tobacco, IMCI). There remains a 
clear hierarchy among global institutions, 
a persistent lack of effective coordination 
mechanisms, or sanctions for non-compliance 
with those that exist. In large part this reflects 
differences in underlying values and perspec-
tives. Powerful interests remain unwilling to 
submit to coordination mechanisms, where 
they exist, that reduce their capacity to act 
if they do not agree with the fundamental 
purposes of these mechanisms. For the SDH, 
the existing configuration of institutions has 
evolved in an ad hoc manner, with the issues of 
poverty and inequality being added to existing 
mandates, rather than fundamentally chang-
ing them. At the same time, institutions with 
closely overlapping mandates have prolifer-
ated. The resulting patchwork of institutional 
mandates, activities, authority and resources 
reflects the absence of an agreed plan or agreed 
strategic vision to tackle the SDH.
• The key global institutions affecting the SDH 
have inadequate systems of transparency and 
accountability. This is especially true of the 
G8, WTO, World Bank and IMF, but also of 
the large charitable foundations which could 
play an important role influencing the SDH. 
Despite efforts to engage with a broader range 
of stakeholders, improve public informa-
tion systems, and provide fuller reporting of 
activities, the transparency of key decision-
making processes remains inadequate. There 
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is also considerable variation in the degree to 
which global institutions are accountable and 
to whom.  In principle some institutions are 
formally accountability to all member states. 
In practice they are accountable to donor 
governments, internal stakeholders such as 
boards of directors, or a combination of these. 
Too few institutions have formal lines of 
accountability to populations affected by their 
activities. There are also concerns that funding 
for global health has shifted from institutions 
accountable to a relatively broad constitu-
ency, such as WHO, to those with limited 
accountability, such as the GFATM and the 
Gates Foundation. The result is even greater 
asymmetries between the capacity to affect 
the lives of constituencies, and accountability 
for such actions. A more critical assessment of 
the quality of transparency and accountability 
mechanisms remains needed.  Foremost, there 
is need for an overall system of “checks and 
balances” within and across global institu-
tions to ensure collective transparency and 
accountability.
• There have been some efforts to diversify 
representation within global institutions 
concerned with the SDH, but limited efforts 
to redistribute power within them. Led by 
WHO, the negotiation of the FCTC allowed 
a prominent role for CSOs. GPPPs are gov-
erned in varied ways combining state, market 
and civil society institutions. These vary in 
the degree to which there are opportunities 
for non-state actors to contribute to formal 
decision making. There also remains debate as 
to what the balance of representation among 
key constituencies should be in emerging 
forms of global governance, notably the most 
effective balance to tackle the SDH. There is a 
clear tension between the need to accommo-
date diverse perspectives, through a plurality 
of institutions, and the optimal use of limited 
resources through coordinated action. How 
can the SDH be served best?
• Although resources for global health have 
increased in recent years (e.g. to GPPPs and 
to initiatives to strengthen cooperation on 
global health issues such as pandemic influ-
enza) the governance of resource mobilization 
and allocation has remained firmly under the 
control of major donors. Decisions continue to 
reflect accountability to foreign and economic 
policy goals, and to domestic constituents 
which, given electoral cycles, tend to favour 
short-term projects and measurable outcomes. 
Efforts to raise additional funds, such as 
UNITAID and the IFF, have been praised for 
raising awareness of the need for increased 
resources. However, concerns remain about 
their governance and, in the case of the IFF, 
its means of resource mobilization. These 
should be seen as an opportunity to reflect on 
how governance of resource mobilization and 
allocation may be strengthened.
• There is a distinct lack of overall leadership 
among global institutions affecting the SDH 
in terms of formally recognized authority. 
Biomedical expertise lies firmly within WHO. 
Other forms of technical expertise are held by 
the World Bank (e.g. economics) and other 
institutions, while financial power remains 
with the IFIs and major donors. CSOs 
may command moral weight, but lack the 
financial clout to assert leadership over other 
institutions. The effectiveness of efforts to 
build cross-sectoral links and action through 
theme or issue-based initiatives (e.g. Poverty 
Reduction Strategies) has been constrained 
by the failure to redistribute authority and 
resources for such purposes.
In summary, the SDH are not well served by the cur-
rent system of global governance, either in the field 
of health or more generally. This system was broadly 
established in the 1940s, with the creation of the IMF 
and World Bank following the 1944 Bretton Woods 
Conference, and the United Nations following the 
1948 Dumbarton Oaks Conference. While many 
changes have occurred since, these have been piece-
meal, generally in response to particular concerns of 
the time, and driven at least as much by political con-
siderations as by global interests. The result is a sys-
tem whose effectiveness and efficiency is undermined 
by a proliferation of institutions, institutional rival-
ries, sometimes unclear or questionable allocations of 
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responsibilities, and often inadequate or ineffective 
coordination mechanisms. At the same time, the le-
gitimacy of organizations, and their effectiveness in 
achieving their goals, are undermined by governance 
structures that reflect the values and power dynamics 
of the colonial era rather than the 21st century, and 
entrench rather than offset inequalities in political and 
economic power. This has resulted in a misdirection 
of resources. It has also skewed priorities away from 
the social determinants of health towards economic 
interests and the geopolitical agendas of major pow-
ers, with potentially serious adverse consequences for 
health.
In broad terms, the overall structure of global gov-
ernance should be fundamentally reviewed, in the 
context of the needs, priorities and political culture 
of the early 21st century. While such a process would 
clearly need to go beyond the SDH, these determi-
nants – with other concerns not recognized as priori-
ties in the 1940s, such as environmental sustainability 
– must clearly play a central role in this process. Such 
a fundamental review would necessarily need to take 
place outside existing structures, in a purpose-specific 
forum akin to the Bretton Woods and Dumbarton 
Oaks conferences. It is imperative for the legitimacy 
and effectiveness of the process that it should be uni-
versally inclusive and representative, with democratic 
representation for all citizens on an equal basis; fully 
transparent and accountable; and independent of sec-
tional interests. Building global institutional and in-
tergovernmental support for such a large but impor-
tant governance initiative requires WHO to promote 
this goal among its member nations, and the global 
institutions with which it presently actively partners.
While this forms the major recommendation arising 
from this paper, several more specific ones follow:
1. There needs to be more critical, detailed and 
systematic assessment of health and non-
health focused institutions, individually and 
collectively, in terms of their de facto concern 
and impact on the various SDH, and the 
effects of their governance structures in this 
context.  This should inform the process 
of reform needed to identify appropriate 
responsibilities among relevant institutions, 
and to improve their governance structures. 
WHO should assume institutional leadership 
in undertaking this assessment, working with 
an arm’s length group of partner institutions, 
CSOs and independent researchers/scholars 
(Lee et al. 1996; Kickbusch 2005; Fidler 
2005b).
2. The contemporary global governance architec-
ture is dominated by institutional and policy 
perspectives that currently constrain action to 
effectively address the SDH. The first step in 
a reform process to correct this imbalance is 
development of criteria for good global gov-
ernance related to the social determinants of 
health, based on the assessments recommended 
above. Again, WHO should assume institu-
tional leadership in this regard (UNDP 1997; 
Lee and Goodman 2001; Labonté et al. 2004).
3. As an initial product of the reform process 
(as above), WHO member states should 
be encouraged to give higher priority to 
addressing the SDH. WHO should reflect 
that priority by allocating substantial and 
commensurate core funding, by hiring more 
social scientists and nurses and by building 
the corresponding capacity of its staff. This 
is to be achieved through the agreement of 
a strategic document describing how WHO 
will be more influential in addressing the 
SDH, and through the adoption of an ad hoc 
resolution in the WHA to this effect. Other 
relevant stakeholders notably those currently 
underrepresented within global institutions 
are to be engaged in this endeavour (Global 
Health Watch 2005).
4. It is recommended that WHO play a lead role 
in providing scientific and technical support 
for action to address the SDH. This review 
of existing global institutions finds WHO 
to be the most appropriate focus for this 
work.  However, the organisation must adapt 
and apply its technical expertise to achieve 
a focused action agenda which gives much 
greater emphasis to tackling the SDH. WHO 
should also monitor trends on key indica-
tors, and serve as the central forum for policy 
debate on such issues.
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5. To effectively play this role, WHO’s inde-
pendence from sectional interests, and the 
symmetry of its accountability to member 
states needs to be more effectively ensured. 
Its conception of health, and institutional 
structure, should also move decisively beyond 
a vertical, disease-specific and bio-medically 
focused model, towards a more holistic and 
multi-disciplinary model which makes a 
reality of the maxim that “health is not merely 
the absence of disease but a complete state 
of physical, mental and social well-being”. 
WHO staffing should reflect this more multi-
disciplinary approach, giving appropriate 
weight, and equal status, to professionals from 
other relevant disciplines such as sociology, 
anthropology, development, international and 
macroeconomics, political science, agriculture 
(e.g. in relation to food security, food safety 
and nutrition) (Peabody 1995).
6. WHO should seek a resolution for formal 
support of SDH in WHO and to ensure 
longer time frame for work and activities.  
An initial list of such work (which requires 
an accurate assessment of, and funding for, 
additional human resources) would include:
• using the Commission report towards 
establishing this role and engaging other 
like-minded international organizations in this 
process, including if possible, other relevant 
specialized agencies and organizations, such as 
UNRISD, WIDER, UNIFEM and UNEP
• convening a broader conference or sets of 
meetings on the SDH (and global governance 
implications) with one or several international 
organizations, with special reference to the 
UN/DESA, ILO and UNRISD, which all 
have shown active interest in the SDH
• broadening and strengthening its presence in 
international trade committees, trade negotia-
tions and WTO Ministerial Meetings, and 
making explicit statements and articulation on 
issues which are of importance to health and 
the SDH
• engaging more forcefully with the donor-
community and other international organisa-
tions on the SDH, to ensure that the links 
between the SDH on the one hand, and 
global economic issues and poverty reduction 
on the other are established, and that global 
vertical campaigns on targeted diseases do not 
compromise broader needs of health systems 
and health policy priorities
• linking up SDH indicators with health equity 
impact assessments and health systems work 
so as to ensure that national level policy and 
program action on the SDH does not remain 
a rhetorical tool
• offering technical assistance and guidance for 
countries on policies and measures that focus 
on addressing the SDH
• working actively with staff and governance 
bodies of the ILO to advance the recommen-
dations arising from the Commission in light 
of efforts to move forward on recommenda-
tions from the World Commission on the 
Social Dimension of Globalisation
• providing a specific website – as part of www.
who.int or elsewhere — with accessible litera-
ture and existing information on the SDH.
7. There is a need for stronger consensus and 
more concerted coordination of relevant 
global institutions if the SDH are to be 
tackled effectively. It is recommended that 
ECOSOC be strengthened and, together with 
WHO, formally tasked to oversee such work, 
with relevant UN organizations including 
WHO reporting to it. Such strengthen-
ing should follow the recommendation of 
WCSDG that ECOSOC upgrade its level of 
representation, including an executive com-
mittee at ministerial level and inter-ministerial 
interaction on key global policy issues.
8. CSOs can better coordinate their actions 
aimed at influencing the key global institu-
tions affecting the SDH. This should include 
the setting up of a “monitoring and watch-
dog” program around discrete subject, areas 
such as the actions of the WHO Executive 
Board, the implementation of relevant WHA 
resolutions, WHO-corporate partnerships, the 
strengthening of relevant regional and WHO 
country level programs, and the appropriate 
mix of professional backgrounds and skills of 
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WHO staff. The WHA should grant CSOs 
increased representation in its proceedings, 
and the management committees of major 
WHO programs relevant to the SDH.
9. The human rights-based approach should be 
used as an analytical and normative framework 
and advocacy tool in support of the SDH by 
WHO and other multilateral institutions. 
The UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to 
Health should be established as a permanent 
position within the UN system, and be 
provided with sufficient resources, to provide 
a focal point for such action. It should remain 
independent of WHO, reporting to the UN. 
Its role should that of a watchdog ensuring in 
part that WHO fulfils its leadership function 
effectively. It should also have a mandate and 
resources to initiate investigations into any 
allegations of poor governance, inappropriate 
resource prioritization or resource allocation, 
and technical incompetence by any global 
institution in matters related to the SDH. 
10. WHO should strengthen its promotion of the 
use of human rights instruments among its 
members, including development of a require-
ment for annual reporting on the progressive 
realization of the Right to Health, the manner 
of which would be developed in collaboration 
with the UN Special Rapporteur. 
11. Global institutions whose policies impact 
significantly on the SDH, notably WHO, 
the World Bank, IMF and WTO, should 
be required to include health ministries and 
relevant CSOs in key decision-making bodies 
and negotiations on issues substantially affect-
ing the SDH.
12. Alternative financing mechanisms, more inde-
pendent of political interference by individual 
donors, should be systematically assessed and 
adopted.  WHO should actively support and 
advocate for various forms of taxation at the 
global level (e.g. Tobin Tax, UNITAID) as 
sources of funding that are potentially sub-
stantial, more sustainable, fair and politically 
independent. Innovative means of allocating 
resources that address the SDH should also be 
vigorously pursued.
Finally, it is imperative that all global institutions 
redistribute power over decision-making to achieve 
more equitable and meaningful representation of a 
fuller range of relevant stakeholders. At the same time, 
evidence shows it is also imperative that public policy 
making on health, and the organizations concerned, 
maintain an appropriate distance from industrial poli-
cies and interests. This returns to our overarching rec-
ommendation that identifies the need for a systematic 
review of the overall system of global governance. A 
redistribution of power within and across global insti-
tutions inevitably follows whatever normative criteria 
are promulgated and advocated by champions for such 
redistribution. Recognizing this, we conclude in Box 
4 with a discussion of some of the normative prin-
ciples that could form the basis for discussion within 
WHO, and its multilateral partners. It is further rec-
ommended that there be an annual reporting require-
ment of WHO staff to the WHA on efforts towards 
building a critical mass of global institutions prepared 
to move toward a redistribution of decision-making 
power, how WHO has changed its own governance 
processes in line with the principles below, and ulti-
mately its progress in addressing the SDH.
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 Box 4.
A key objective of global governance is to enable the 
global community to achieve collective action in its 
collective interests. This requires a democratization of 
institutions and processes to ensure that influence over 
decisions appropriately reflects the balance of interests 
between countries and population groups.
In dealing with these issues, it is essential that long-
term needs and objectives be given due weight, 
despite the short time-horizons which characterize 
national governments. This suggests a need to 
consider alternative mechanisms for the selection 
of representatives by, and their accountability to 
governments – for example, shifting this role from the 
executive to the legislative branch.
Given the inter-connectedness of economic, social and 
environmental issues (not least in relation to health), it 
is also essential that the basis of the structure be on a 
holistic rather than a fragmentary approach. This requires 
an appropriate overall structure and division of labour 
between agencies, avoiding proliferation of agencies in 
closely related or overlapping fields. It should also ensure 
effective mechanisms for collaboration and coordination 
in areas where different institutions mandates intersect.
In any international institutional framework, decisions 
affecting the social determinants of health at the 
global level should observe the right to “participation 
of the population in all health-related decision-making 
at the community, national and international levels”
(http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(symbol)/
E.C.12.2000.4.En?OpenDocument para 11).
Principles of democracy, 
accountability and transparency
All international institutions should observe democratic 
standards accepted at the national level in countries 
generally accepted as democratic. This includes 
decision-making processes in which:
a) all people and countries are represented
b) votes are based on equal representation of coun-
tries or in relation to population, and not weighted 
by economic variables 
c) representatives are directly or indirectly account-
able to the populations they represent (this 
might be better achieved through election by 
and accountability to legislatures rather than 
executives)
d) all representatives have resources and opportuni-
ties to influence decisions proportional to the 
effects of such decisions on those they represent
e) representatives are independent of, and not 
subject to undue influence by, interest groups other 
than the populations they represent
f) full transparency of all processes is consistently 
observed
g) those represented are able to express their views to 
their representatives before decisions are taken, on 
the basis of full information and documentation
h) all decisions are taken through processes which 
conform to these standards
i) effective independent mechanisms are in place to 
ensure conformity with these standards.
Heads of all international organizations should 
be selected through transparent mechanisms 
that conform to similar standards, and are based 
on the merits of candidates rather than political 
considerations. Consideration should be given to 
the establishment of a standing body, with members 
elected by parliamentarians on a regional basis, 
with responsibility for appointing the heads of all 
international organisations on the basis of advice from 
ad hoc committees of specialists it would convene for 
each appointment.
.
General normative principles for reforming global governance
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